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REGULATING BANKRUPTCY BONUSES
JARED A. ELLIAS*
In 2005, the perception that wealthy executives were being rewarded
for failure led Congress to ban Chapter 11 firms from paying retention
bonuses to senior managers. Under the new law, debtors could still pay
bonuses to executives-but only "incentive" bonuses triggered by
accomplishing challenging performance goals that go beyond merely
remaining employed. This Article uses newly collected data to examine how
this reform changed bankruptcy practice. While relatively fewer firms use
court-approved bonus plans after the reform, the overall level of executive
compensation appears to be similar, perhaps because the new regime left
large gaps that make it easy for firms to bypass the 2005 law and pay
managers without the judge's permission. This Article argues that the new
law was undermined by institutional weaknesses in Chapter 11, as
bankruptcy judges are poorly situated to analyze bonus plans and creditors
have limited incentives to police executive compensation themselves.
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INTRODUCTION
When large firms struggle financially, they usually restructure by
firing employees, cutting the pay of those who remain, and cancelling
promised pensions. While these measures are often necessary, they can
seem unfair when highly paid senior managers do not appear to share in the
pain.1 This unfairness became a major public issue in the early 2000s, as
formerly-high-flying titans of corporate America like K-Mart, Enron, and
WorldCom filed for headline-grabbing Chapter 11 bankruptcies and
subsequently paid millions of dollars in bonuses to senior managers.
2 The
1. See Gretchen Morgenson, MARKET WATCH; A Year's Debacles, From Comic to Epic, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 30, 2003), https://www.nytimes.com/2003/12/28/business/market-watch-a-year-s-debacles
-from-comic-to-epic.html (condemning American Airlines for negotiating wage concessions from its
unionized workers while rewarding top executives with retention bonuses and setting aside $40 million
to protect the pensions of executives); see also David Olive, Many CEOs Richly Rewarded for Failure;
They Didn't Suffer as Stocks Tanked in New Economy, TORONTO STAR, Aug. 25, 2002, at Al 0.
2. These bonus plans were very controversial because the payment of bonuses in bankruptcy is
a public event, leading to press coverage. See Bloomberg News, Bankruptcy Court Approves FAO
Executive Pay Plan, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 15, 2003), https://www.nytimes.com/2003/02/15/business
/company-news-bankruptcy-court-approves-fao-executive-pay-plan.html (noting an approved FAO Inc.
executive-retention plan paying $1.1 million in bonuses); see also Seth Schiesel, Revised Contract for
WorldCom's New Chief Executive Wins Approval from 2 Judges, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 17, 2002),
https://www.nytimes.com/200
2/12/17/business/revised-contract-for-worldcom-s-new-chief-executive-
wins-approval-from-2-judges.html (detailing the executive compensation plan for the CEO of
WorldCom, which was approved during the company's bankruptcy); Rhonda L. Rundle, FPA s CEO
Received Salary Increase Five Days Before Chapter 11 Filing, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 3, 1998),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB9020
9 75846553 7 30 0 0. Senator Charles Grassley, Republican of Iowa,
summarized the populist argument against bankruptcy bonuses in a 2012 letter demanding that the
Department of Justice police them more vigorously: "Corporate directors, executives and managers who
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ensuing public outrage contributed to a growing sense that the economy
had become rigged in favor of high-level executives who prospered no
matter how poorly their companies fared.3
In 2005, Congress responded to this public outcry by banning
Chapter 11 debtors from paying retention bonuses to high-level
executives.4 This legal reform eliminated part of then-existing bankruptcy
practice, as the largest firms typically paid retention bonuses shortly after
filing for bankruptcy on the theory that bonuses were needed to keep
employees working hard to turn the firm around.s However, the reform did
were at the helm of a company as it spiraled into bankruptcy should not receive bonuses of any kind, let
alone excessive bonuses, during a reorganization or liquidation." Mike Spector & Tom McGinty, U.S.
Is Asked to Review Bankruptcy Bonuses, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 13, 2012), https://www.wsj.com
/articles/SB10001424052970204642604577218033661586936.
3. See, e.g., Kristine Henry, Beth Bonus Called Good Way to Keep Salaried Steel Talent, BALT.
SUN (Jan. 6, 2002), https://www.baltimoresun.com/news/bs-xpm-2002-01-06-0201050169-story.html
(detailing executive retention plans paid out in high-profile Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases); Nelson D.
Schwartz, Greed-Mart Attention, Kmart Investors. The Company May Be Bankrupt, but Its Top Brass
Have Been Raking It In, FORTUNE (Oct. 14, 2002), http://archive.fortune.com/magazines
/fortune/fortunearchive/2002/10/14/330017/index.htm. Many bankruptcy lawyers at the time were also
upset by this behavior, fearing that managers were abusing Chapter 11 to extract excessive
compensation at the expense of public confidence in the bankruptcy system. See generally Robert J.
Keach, The Case Against KERPS, 041003 AM. BANKR. INST. 9 (2003) (discussing issues with key
employee retention plans ("KERPS") at the American Bankruptcy Institute's 2003 Annual Spring
Meeting).
4. See In re U.S. Airways, Inc., 329 B.R. 793, 797 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2005) ("Congressional
concern over KERP excesses is clearly reflected in changes to the Bankruptcy Code that will become
effective for cases filed after October 17, 2005."); see also Dorothy Hubbard Cornwell, To Catch a
KERP: Devising a More Effective Regulation than §503(c), 25 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 485, 486-87
(2009) (discussing the amendments to the Bankruptcy Code); Rebecca Revich, The KERP Revolution,
81 AM. BANKR. L.J. 87, 88-92 (2007) (explaining how Congress restricted the ability of Chapter 11
debtors to "retain management employees under programs generally referred to as Key Employee
Retention Plans (KERPs)"). In support of the ban, Senator Edward Kennedy delivered a memorable
floor statement condemning "glaring abuses of the bankruptcy system by the executives of giant
companies." In re Dana Corp., 358 B.R. 567, 575 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006) (noting statement of Senator
Kennedy in support of the amendments and discussing the legislative history of the amendments to
section 503 of the Bankruptcy Code). It is worth noting that beyond the arguments over the propriety of
paying bankruptcy bonuses, some observers questioned their efficacy, noting, for example, that after
Kmart implemented a KERP plan, nineteen of the twenty-five covered executives left within six months
and that Enron's KERP failed to staunch the outflow of talented employees. Keach, supra note 3.
5. The executive compensation restrictions were a very minor piece of a much larger reform, as
part of a bill called the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005
("BAPCPA"), Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005) (codified as amended in scattered titles of the
U.S. Code). While this paper is the first to study the executive compensation restrictions in this degree
of detail, many other papers study other aspects of this reform. See generally, e.g., Kenneth Ayotte,
Leases and Executory Contracts in Chapter II, 12 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 637 (2015); Pamela
Foohey et al., Life in the Sweatbox, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 219 (2018); Robert M. Lawless et al., Did
Bankruptcy Reform Fail? An Empirical Study of Consumer Debtors, 82 AM. BANKR. L.J. 349 (2008);
Michael Simkovic, The Effect ofBAPCPA on Credit Card Industry Profits and Prices, 83 AM. BANKR.
L.J. 1 (2009).
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not ban Chapter 11 debtors from paying any type of bonus to senior
managers-only bonuses triggered by a manager's mere continued
employment. Under the new regime, Chapter 11 debtors can pay bonuses if
they convince a bankruptcy judge that the bonuses are "incentive" bonuses,
or bonuses managers would only receive if they accomplish specific,
challenging performance goals.
6
This Article offers the first comprehensive analysis and empirical
study of how the 2005 law changed corporate bankruptcy practice. As
further explained below, the data suggest that the reform appears to have
had little substantive effect on executive compensation.' The evidence
suggests that this is primarily due to two flaws that undermine the reform.
First, the new law only regulates payments characterized as bonuses during
the period when firms are in Chapter 11 bankruptcy. Firms can easily
sidestep the new law by paying managers before or after the bankruptcy
case, and many appear to have done so.
8 Second, bankruptcy law
institutions have struggled to administer the law. A rule that bans retention
bonuses while allowing incentive bonuses requires bankruptcy judges to
make fact-intensive determinations about the "challengingness" of a
6. For example, a Chapter 11 bonus plan might require management o increase earnings or
move through Chapter 11 quickly. See infra notes 46 and 57 and accompanying text.
7. Bankruptcy lawyers largely share this skeptical view of the efficacy of the reform. See, e.g.,
Eric Morath, Bankruptcy Beat: ABI Poll Casts Doubt on Bonus Reforms, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 21, 2009),
https://blogs.wsj.com/bankruptcy/
2 0 09/10/21/abi-poll-casts-doubt-on-bonus-reforms (reporting survey
results that a majority of respondents agree that the reform was not effective in limiting executive
compensation). These poll results are consistent with other anecdotal evidence in the popular media.
See, e.g., Nathan Koppel & Paul Davies, Bankruptcy-Law Overhaul Has Wiggle Room; Limits Set on
Key Executives' Pay, but Door Is Wide Open on Bonuses Linked to Achieving Certain Goals, WALL ST.
J., https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB114342447
3 70208 7 1 8  (last updated Mar. 27, 2006)
("[B]ankruptcy lawyers say companies have managed to sidestep some of the law's provisions."). Lee
R. Bogdanoff, a founding partner of the law firm Klee, Tuchin, Bogdanoff & Stern LLP in Los
Angeles, was quoted by Bloomberg News as saying that "[t]he amendment to the code changed the
means, but not the value of these plans . . . It's just changed the way you get there, not necessarily how
much management gets at the end." Steven Church, Bujfets Rewards Managers Who Put Chain in




05/buffets-rewards-managers-who-put-chain-in-bankruptcy. A former Department of Justice official
charged with supervising the bankruptcy system argues, "Congress took a stab at righting the problem
and companies quickly found a way to circumvent their intent." Mike Spector & Tom McGinty, The
CEO Bankruptcy Bonus, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 27, 2012), https://www.wsj.com/articles
/SB10001424053111903703604576584480750545602. A contemporaneous working paper provides
suggestive evidence that at least some firms contracted around the reform. See Vedran Capkun & Evren
Ors, When the Congress Says "PIP Your KERP": Performance Incentive Plans, Key Employee
Retention Plans, and Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Resolution (Feb. 15, 2009) (unpublished manuscript),
https://people.hec.edu/ors/wp-content/uploads/sites/
24/2018/02/PIP yourKERP_20140104.pdf ("By
trying to suppress KERPs, which were deemed to be 'self-dealing' plans proposed by unscrupulous
managers, BAPCPA appears to have led to 'structural arbitrage."').
8. See infra Section III.B.I.c.
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proposed bonus plan. Unfortunately, bankruptcy judges often lack the
information and expertise necessary to perform this inquiry.9 Although
creditors would appear to be well-situated to assist the judge and scrutinize
executive compensation themselves, they have little economic incentive to
quibble over relatively small bonuses, because doing so might anger the
managers with whom they need to negotiate more important Chapter 11
issues.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I describes how bankruptcy
bonuses became a frequent subject of public outrage and how Congress
changed the law in 2005 to alter the process through which Chapter 11
debtors pay executive bonuses. Part II explains potential flaws in the design
of the reform and develops hypotheses about how those design flaws
arguably doomed its implementation. Part III summarizes the sampling and
data gathering methodologies and then presents evidence that illustrates the
design flaws predicted in Part II. One question that this Article does not
answer is whether there actually was a problem that needed fixing prior to
the 2005 reform. Most Chapter 11 attorneys appear to believe so, but this is
an empirical question that is impossible to answer with available data.
However, because the evidence presented in this Article does not support
the view that Chapter 11 executive compensation was improved by the
reform, Part IV argues that Congress should rethink the 2005 reform.
I. THE RISE OF BANKRUPTCY BONUSES AND THE 2005
BANKRUPTCY REFORMS
Part I first summarizes how the phrase "bankruptcy bonus" entered the
public lexicon and why these bonuses became so controversial. Next, I
explore the legislative history of the 2005 reform, before discussing the
ways in which the new law altered the ability of Chapter 11 debtors to pay
bonuses to their executives.
A. THE RISE OF BONUSES AS A PROMINENT FEATURE OF CHAPTER 11
BANKRUPTCY
For the first two decades of the Bankruptcy Act of 1978, bonus plans
approved by bankruptcy judges were not an important part of bankruptcy
9. See infra Section III.B.2.b. The fact that bonuses created by the post-2005 incentive bonus
plans are similarly sized to the pre-reform retention plans casts doubt on the notion that these bonuses
came with the additional risk that would come from truly challenging performance goals. Michael C.
Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, CEO Incentives-It's Not How Much You Pay, but How, HARV. Bus. REV.,
May-June 1990, at 138 (outlining the difficulty of adequately linking executive pay to compensation
while simultaneously not appearing to overpay executives).
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practice.'0 The new Bankruptcy Code contained few provisions dealing
with executive compensation, and bankruptcy courts routinely granted
uncontroversial motions to pay employees their promised salaries." This
quiet period ended in the early twenty-first century, as Chapter 11 debtors
and the law firms advising them developed a practice of paying retention
bonuses outside the ordinary course of business after filing for
bankruptcy.12 Generally, firms that wanted to pay retention bonuses would
file a motion asking the judge to approve "Key Employee Retention Plans,"
or "KERPs," which created schedules of payments of retention bonuses.
13
10. See Sreedhar T. Bharath et al., The Changing Nature of Chapter 11 at 12-14 (Fisher Coll. of
Bus., Paper No. 2008-03-003, 2010), http://ssm.com/abstract-11023
6 6 .
11. See, e.g., Motion of Debtor and Debtor in Possession Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 105,
507(a)(3), 507(a)(4) and the "Doctrine of Necessity" for an Order Authorizing It to Pay: (A) Prepetition
Emp. Wages, Salaries and Related Items; (B) Prepetition Emp. Bus. Expenses; (C) Prepetition
Contributions to and Benefits Under Emp. Benefit Plans; (D) Prepetition Emp. Payroll Deductions and
Withholdings; and (E) All Costs and Expenses Incident to the Foregoing Payments and Contributions
Filed by Debtor-in-Possession Bush Indus., Inc. at 13, In re Bush Indus., 315 BR. 292
(Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2004) (No. 04-12295).
12. In re Allied Holdings, Inc., 337 B.R. 716, 721 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2005) ("KERP programs
such as the one the Debtors seek approval to implement have become customary uses of estate funds in
large business reorganizations."); see also David A. Skeel, Jr., Creditors' Ball: The "New" New
Corporate Governance in Chapter 11, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 917, 926-28 (2003) (discussing innovations
in executive compensation and the evolution of bankruptcy bonuses); Mechele A. Dickerson,
Approving Employee Retention and Severance Programs: Judicial Discretion Run Amuck, II AM.
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 93, 96-97 (2003) (discussing the prevalence of retention bonuses offered in
Chapter 11 cases); James H. M. Sprayregen et al., First Things First-A Primer on How to Obtain
Appropriate "First Day" Relief in Chapter 1] Cases, II J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 275, 299 (2002)
(suggesting Chapter II debtors consider bonus plans as part of bankruptcy planning). A
contemporaneous press account suggests that bonuses became a common feature because many of the
formerly high-flying tech firms had high bankruptcy costs associated with a prolonged stay in Chapter
11 that would leave little value for creditors in the event creditors were forced to hire new managers. In
effect, the inability of Chapter 11 to preserve the going concern value of telecom firms provided
managers with the power to extract holdout value in exchange for remaining at their desks. One
investment banker was quoted as saying that sophisticated activist bondholders budgeted for bankruptcy
bonuses when they made their investments in the firm's debt. Ann Davis, Want Some Extra Cash? File
for Chapter 11, WALL ST. J., Oct. 31, 2001, at Cl (discussing the rise in popularity of Chapter 11
bonuses and the changing views among creditors). By keeping them at their desks with retention
payments, creditors retain value in the firm that would otherwise be lost if they were to quit. Yair
Listkoin criticizes retention payments for not being more closely related to positive bankruptcy
outcomes. Yair Listokin, Paying for Performance in Bankruptcy: Why CEOs Should Be Compensated
with Debt, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 777, 790 (2007) (summarizing arguments against "pay to stay"
compensation). Robert Rasmussen makes an argument that Congress erred by eliminating retention
bonuses because they usefully provided creditors-the new owners-with a real option regarding the
debtor's workers. That is to say, by retaining employees long enough to evaluate them, retention
bonuses serve the useful purpose of allowing creditors or new managers to decide who to keep. See
Robert K. Rasmussen, On the Scope of Managerial Discretion in Chapter 11, 156 U. PA. L. REV.
PENNUMBRA 77, 80-85 (2007).
13. Sandra E. Mayerson & Chirstalette Hoey, Employee Issues from Pre-Petition Severance to
Post-Petition Defaulted Pension Plans; and Standards for Permitting Senior Management Bonuses,
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Chapter 11 debtors offered two main justifications for why they
needed to pay retention bonuses. First, they usually pointed to the value
that the debtor's current employees contribute to the restructuring effort.14
Incumbent employees often have firm-specific knowledge that would be
costly to lose and hard to replicate in new employees." Even if the
knowledge could be replicated, Chapter 11 debtors may fear that they will
have trouble attracting new employees because new hires might hesitate
before accepting a job with a bankrupt company.16
Second, many debtors claimed that they needed to update their
compensation practices to avoid underpaying employees.'7  This
underpayment problem arose because of the growing complexity of
executive pay packages.'8 At a high level, executive compensation consists
of two components: (1) a "base" payment, (2) and a "bonus" payment. The
base payment is what we usually think of as salary; the amount of money
that a manager expects to be paid for showing up to work every day.'9 The
bonus payment is a catchall term that consists of all performance-related
pay, such as rewards for achieving a sales goal or remaining an employee
092002 AM. BANKR. INST. 409 (2002).
14. See, e.g., In re Aerovox, Inc., 269 B.R. 74, 76 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2001).
The Debtor summarized the incentives it designed as follows: 1) to keep the eligible
employees, including the Key Employees, in the Debtors employ; 2) to compensate the
eligible employees, including the Key Employees, for assuming "additional administrative
and operational burdens imposed on the Debtor by its Chapter 11 case;" and 3) to allow the
eligible employees, including the Key Employees, to use "their best efforts to ensure the
maximization of estate assets for the benefits of creditors."
Id. (internal citations omitted).
15. Id. at 79.
Moreover, in the Board's view, replacing the Key Employees would cause the Debtor to incur
significant costs. Mr. Horsley testified that the process of replacing any one of the Key
Employees could cost up to one years' salary in order to cover the cost of a headhunter and
other recruitment expenses. He added that, even if the Debtor were to find qualified
replacements, it would not be able to quickly get these new employees "up to speed." This
cost-benefit analysis weighed heavily into the Board's ultimate decision.
Id.
16. See id.
17. In the face of intense criticism, firms began to change their compensation practices to try to
align pay with performance. See, e.g., Jensen & Murphy, supra note 9.
18. See Brian J. Hall & Jeffrey B. Liebman, Are CEOs Really Paid Like Bureaucrats?, 113 Q.J.
ECON. 653, 661-63 (1998) (finding that most of the pay increase for chief executive officers between
1980 and 1994 was in the form of stock options, which increased the percentage of a firm's total
compensation package weighted towards performance compensation).
19. See Kevin J. Murphy, Executive Compensation, in 3B HANDBOOK OF LABOR ECONOMICs
2485, 2491 (Orley Ashenfeller & David Card eds., 1999) ("[M]ost executive pay packages contain four
basic components: a base salary, an annual bonus tied to accounting performance, stock options, and
longterm incentive plans (including restricted stock plans and multi-year accounting-based performance
plans)."). Stock compensation includes both outright grants of stock as well as restricted stock and stock
options.
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of the firm for a certain period of time.
20 Increasingly, in the early 1990s,
large firms began to rely on bonus compensation, creating new pressure to
update performance-compensation policies to reflect changes in the firm's
business and the disruption created by bankruptcy.
21 Accordingly, Chapter
11 debtors argued that they needed to pay retention bonuses to avoid
paying valuable employees significantly less money than they were
accustomed to making, undermining morale and retention.
22
20. The compensation consulting firm Equilar reported that in 2013, 63.8% of S&P 1500
companies used some form of performance-based equity compensation, 82.8% used short-term 
cash
incentives, 15% had a discretionary cash bonus, and 8.3% had a long-term incentive plan tied 
to
multiyear performance goals. EQUILAR, CEO PAY STRATEGIES REPORT 4-5 (2014),
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/us/Documents/regulatory/us-aers-ceo-pay-strategies-
report-2014-equilar-july-2014-020915.pdf. While Equilar does not aggregate these numbers, it is 
fair to
assume that virtually all large firms use bonus compensation. The pre-bankruptcy use of stock
compensation can be in and of itself sufficient to require a new compensation 
policy, as Chapter II
usually ends with pre-bankruptcy shareholders receiving no recovery. See generally Notice of Filing of
Amended Disclosure Statement for Debtors' Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization Pursuant 
to
Chapter 11 of the Bankr. Code, In re Hawker Beechcraft, Inc., 486 B.R. 264 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2013)
(No. 12-11873) [hereinafter Hawker Beechcraft Disclosure].
21. See Hall & Liebman, supra note 18. Firms have two alternatives to adjusting compensation
policy in bankruptcy, but they are unattractive, for different reasons. One option is to adjust
management's compensation pre-bankruptcy by giving them large base salaries, which effectively
reweights their compensation away from bonus and towards base. Doing so creates important risks for 
a
firm, as news of bonus payments can disrupt negotiations with creditors and create liability 
for the
executive who might find the payment clawed back as a fraudulent conveyance. Alternatively, the firm
can avoid adjusting compensation until after bankruptcy, which creates the risk that managers might
leave the firm rather than wait for an uncertain payment. See James Sprayregen et al., Recent Lessons




22. See, e.g., Mitchell A. Seider et al., Two Recent Decisions Highlight Pitfalls in Creating and
Implementing Key Employee Incentive Plans for Executives in Bankruptcy Cases, LATHAM &
WATKINS: CLIENT ALERT (Sept. 24, 2012), https://www.1w.com/thoughtLeadership/employee-incentive
-plans-executives-bankruptcy ("[1]t may be difficult to replicate . . . employees' pre-petition
compensation during the Chapter 11 case because a significant part of their compensation may have
been in the form of stock options (which are likely worthless in light of the bankruptcy proceedings)
and performance bonuses based on metrics that are no longer achievable. Furthermore, these employees
may seriously consider other employment opportunities that do not involve the risks inherent 
in
working for a company in Chapter 11."); Notice of (1) Filing of the Solicitation Version of the
Amended Disclosure Statement for the Debtors' Solicitation Version of the Amended Joint Plan of
Reorganization Pursuant to Chapter II of the Bankruptcy Code and (2) Deadline for Parties to Object
Thereto, In re Hawker Beechcraft, Inc., 486 B.R. 264 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2013) (No. 12-11873)
("[C]urrent compensation levels for each of the KERP Participants are below market levels largely
because no MIP or Equity Investment Plan bonuses have been paid in recent years and also due to a
decrease in earned commissions. The Debtors believe the KERP will aid the Debtors' retention of the
KERP Participants and will incentivize them to expend the additional efforts and time necessary to
maximize the value of the Debtors' assets.").
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B. AS THE ECONOMY FELL INTO RECESSION IN THE EARLY 2000S, THE
PUBLIC SALIENCE AND CONTROVERSY OVER CHAPTER 11 BONUSES
INCREASED
These retention bonus plans became the subject of controversy in the
early 2000's for three main reasons. First, the public spectacle of a failed
firm paying millions of dollars in bonuses to senior managers while firing
workers naturally led to populist outrage.23 The controversy over
bankruptcy-related pay echoed the still-raging public controversy over the
high levels of executive pay, which seemed unfair to many observers and
was especially salient after the dot-com bust sent the nation into
recession.2 4
Second, the bonuses attracted criticism from some commentators who
worried that the public nature of the payments and the large amount of
media attention that they attracted were undermining public confidence in
the bankruptcy process.25
Third-and most importantly from the perspective of bankruptcy
policy-some observers believed that management was exploiting the basic
structure of Chapter 11 to extract undeserved pay.26 When a firm files for
bankruptcy, existing management remains in control of the business, giving
managers great influence over the firm and its stakeholders.27
23. See, e.g., Nancy Rivera Brooks, Enron Execs Were Paid to Remain, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 7,
2001), http://articles.latimes.com/2001/dec/07/business/fi-12293.
24. See, e.g., Henry, supra note 3 (detailing executive retention plans paid out in high-profile
Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases).
25. At the 2003 Annual Spring Conference of the American Bankruptcy Institute, a lawyer
arguing against allowing KERPs worried very much that the failure to curb bankruptcy bonus abuse (in
the form of the Key Employee Retention Plans that had become a routine part of bankruptcy practice)
would result in congressional intervention. See Critical Vendor Motions, Retention Bonuses Headed for
Endangered List, 39 BANKR. CT. DECISIONS: WKLY. NEWS & COMMENT 1 (Aug. 13, 2002); see also
Keach, supra note 3.
26. See M. Todd Henderson, Paying CEOs in Bankruptcy: Executive Compensation When
Agency Costs Are Low, 101 Nw. U. L. REv. 1543, 1543-44, 1570 (2007) ("According to [academic
accounts of bankruptcy], the Bankruptcy Code's preference for management operation of the debtor
allows managers to extract rents in the form of higher salaries, big option grants, and lavish retention
and emergence bonuses."); Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Corporate Governance in the
Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 669, 740 (1993)
("In the course of our study, we became suspicious that some CEOs were using leverage generated from
the power vested in the debtor-in-possession by the Bankruptcy Code to negotiate increases in their
personal compensation."); Lucien Ayre Bebchuk & Howard F. Chang, Bargaining and the Division of
Value in Corporate Reorganization, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 253, 267 n.14 (1992) ("In reality, the
incumbent management controls the agenda during this initial period [of Chapter 11 Bankruptcy].").
27. Alan Schwartz, A Contract Theory Approach to Business Bankruptcy, 107 YALE L.J. 1807,
1836 (1998) (noting Chapter 11 is preferable to Chapter 7 for current management, in terms of ability to
manipulate the process for personal gain); see also Henderson, supra note 26, at 1574 (noting a
662 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92:653
Management's control over the bankruptcy process can lead the board of
directors and even creditors to seek to pay managers for desired outcomes,
such as enticing management o agree to sell the firm.
28 The dislocations
created by bankruptcy can also provide management with bargaining
power.29 The board of directors may fear that the departure of a key
executive would seriously reduce the prospect of a successful
reorganization, creating an opportunity for opportunistic managers to
demand more pay than they deserve.
30 This agency problem threatens the
basic structure of Chapter 11 bankruptcy, a process in which a firm's asset
value is supposed to be maximized for the benefit of pre-bankruptcy
creditors, not the personal wealth of incumbent managers.
Of course, the Bankruptcy Code recognizes the power that
management has over a corporation in bankruptcy and thus creates a strong
system of checks and balances to counterbalance managerial power.
31 The
first line of defense is the federal bankruptcy judge, who must approve any
payment of bonuses.32 Next, bankruptcy law appoints an "[o]fficial
[c]ommittee of [u]nsecured [c]reditors" to act as a "watchdog" that
scrutinizes management's business decisions.
33 This conmittee is generally
composed of some of the firm's major creditors, who stand to receive lower
potential factor favoring management in Chapter 11 is "the possibility that creditors will tolerate
inefficient or unfair compensation to curry favor with CEOs, since the debtor has the exclusive right to
propose a reorganization plan"); LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 26, at 692 ("[M]anagement of the
debtor corporation routinely remains in office after [the bankruptcy] filing and has considerable power
over both the business plan and the reorganization plan.").
28. One student researcher interviewed legendary bankruptcy attorney Harvey Miller in 2005
and reported:
Eventually, according to Miller, the negotiations come to point where the controlling
distressed investors tell the CEO, "if you want to be CEO of the company, don't fight
us-because if you fight and we win, you're dead." According to Miller, some management
teams will eventually give in, often after the distressed investors have agreed to provide them
with post-emergence employment contracts.
Paul M. Goldschmid, Note, More Phoenix Than Vulture: The Case for Distressed Investor Presence in
the Bankruptcy Reorganization Process, 2005 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 191, 266-67 (2005).
29. See Henderson, supra note 26, at 1575-76 (2007) ("Thus, given the firm's poor
performance, whether or not it can be deemed to be the CEO's fault, the firm should be able to pay the
CEO less, but the costs of the next best alternative are so much higher that the CEO is actually in a
stronger negotiating position.").
30. See LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 26, at 742 ("[fn some reorganization cases
management derives considerable power from their incumbency.").
31. See id. at 694-720 (describing the checks on management).
32. In re Salant Corp., 176 B.R. 131, 132 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) ("The Bankruptcy Court approved the
bonus to [the CEO] at the confirmation hearing . . . ."); see also In re Velo Holdings Inc., 472 BR. 201,
204 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012) (approving KERP during bankruptcy case).
33. See, e.g., In re W. Pac. Airlines, Inc., 219 BR. 575, 578 (D. Colo. 1998) ("[A] creditors
committee serves something of a 'watchdog' function in bankruptcy and enjoys unique rights and
responsibilities under the Code.").
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payouts at the end of the bankruptcy case if the firm overpays
management.34 The committee will usually have a high-powered law firm
and investment bank assisting them, and they will analyze any proposed
bonus plan to determine whether it overpays managers.35 To the extent that
creditors believe management is extracting undeserved pay, they can file
written objections informing the judge of the bonus plan's problems and
negotiate in the shadow of those objections and the right to object.36
Further, the Department of Justice's United States Trustee Program
provides a second level of governmental oversight that helps the
bankruptcy judge assess the motions in front of her.37 Congress created the
United States Trustee Program as a part of the Bankruptcy Act of 1978 to
oversee the then-new system of bankruptcy courts.38 Each district has its
own Office of the United States Trustee, which generally consists of
several attorneys and other legal professionals.39 These lawyers supervise
all bankruptcy cases, looking for evidence that bankruptcy law is being
abused.40 The United States Trustee has the right to file an objection of its
own if it determines that management is using its control of the corporation
to extract excessive compensation.41
Prior to the 2005 reform, this system of checks and balances lay
34. Wei Jiang et al., Hedge Funds and Chapter 11, 67 J. FIN. 513, 527 n. 10 (2012).
35. See generally Jared A. Ellias, Do Activist Investors Constrain Managerial Moral Hazard in
Chapter I?: Evidence from Junior Activist Investing, 8 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 493 (2016) (finding
activist investors actually reduce self-dealing and promote the goals of bankmptcy); Michelle M.
Harner & Jamie Marincic, Committee Capture? An Empirical Analysis of the Role of Creditors'
Committees in Business Reorganizations, 64 VAND. L. REv. 749 (2011) (providing data on the impact
of creditors on bankruptcy proceedings).
36. See Ellias, supra note 35, at 495 ("In Chapter 11, managers must obtain judicial approval for
all major business decisions . . . [creditors] may inform the judge that management is abusing Chapter
11 and file motions seeking judicial relief.").
37. See Charles Jordan Tabb, The History of the Bankruptcy Laws in the United States, 3 AM.
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 5, 35 (1995). ("In 1986 the United States Trustee system was established
nationwide . . .. An attempt was made to relieve bankruptcy judges of administrative duties, thereby
permitting them to focus more exclusively on their judicial role.").
38. See id.
39. About the Program: The United States Trustee Program, U.S. DEP'T JUST.,
https://www.justice.gov/ust/about-program (last updated Mar. 6, 2019).
40. Id.
41. See Objection of the U.S. Trustee to Debtors' Motion Pursuant to Section 363(b) of the
Bankr. Code for Authorization to Implement a Key Emp. Incentive Plan at 9, In re BearingPoint, Inc.,
453 B.R. 486 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011) (No. 09-10691) [hereinafter BearingPoint Objection].
The Motion is not supported by any indication that the costs of the KEIP are reasonable under
the circumstances. To the contrary, the currently-prevailing view here appears to be that such
proceeds will be insufficient to generate a recovery for unsecured creditors. Also, there is no
basis on which to conclude that the $7.0 million cost of the Debtors' revised bonus plan is
reasonable ....
Id.
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dormant because bankruptcy law instructed the judge to defer to
management in determining if bonuses were needed.
42 Chapter 11 debtors
only needed to convince the judge that a proposed retention bonus plan was
the product of reasonable business judgment.
43 This was an easy standard
to satisfy, and firms would do so by arguing that the employees were
important to the successful reorganization of the business
44 and that the
board of directors engaged in some sort of deliberative process to develop
the plan.45
C. CONGRESS EMPOWERS THE OVERSIGHT OF MANAGERS AND RESTRICTS
RETENTION BONUSES WiTH THE 2005 REFORM
This equilibrium changed when Congress banned retention bonuses as
part of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of
2005 (the "BAPCPA").46 Congress sought to "eradicate the notion that
executives were entitled to bonuses simply for staying with the Company
through the bankruptcy process."47 After the reform, bankruptcy judges
42. That's not to say that judges did not sometimes reject bonus plans. Levitz Judge Rejects
Bankruptcy Bonus, Limits Severance Package, 2 ANDREWS BANKR. LITIG. REP. 7 (2005) (discussing
Judge Burton Lifland's rejection of a proposed retention bonus in the Levitz Homes bankruptcy when
the company had mostly outsourced operation of its business to consultants).
43. See In re Montgomery Ward Holding Corp., 242 B.R. 147, 155 (D. Del. 1999) (noting the
discretion the bankruptcy court has to defer to management's business judgment in approving
bankruptcy bonus plans). Bankruptcy courts approved executive bonuses upon a showing by the debtor
that: (i) the debtor used proper business judgment in creating the plan, and (ii) the plan is "fair and
reasonable." Emily Watson Harring, Walking and Talking like a KERP: Implications of BAPCPA
Section 503(c) for Effective Leadership at Troubled Companies, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1285, 1293
(2008); see also George W. Kuney, Hijacking Chapter 11, 21 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 19, 78-80 (2004)
(summarizing the standard in pre-BAPCA cases). Kuney notes that this standard was either considered
overly permissive or unnecessarily restrictive, depending on the particular biases of the critic. Id at 80;
accord Cornwell, supra note 4, at 493-94 (summarizing the pre-BAPCA standard).
44. In re Brooklyn Hosp. Ctr., 341 BR. 405, 409 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2006); see also In re
Aerovox, Inc., 269 B.R. 74, 79 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2001) (discussing the importance of the employees to
the turnaround effort).
45. See Brooklyn Hosp. Ctr., 341 B.R. at 412 (discussing the deliberations of the Board); see also
In re Georgetown Steel Co., 306 B.R. 549, 554 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2004) ("The CEO described the
deliberations of the Board of Directors with respect to the Retention Motion as well as the processes
utilized to arrive at the final amount of the Retention Plan."); Aerovox, 269 B.R. at 81-82 ("[Tlhe Board
utilized sound business judgment in evaluating the need for and financial implications of 
the
KERP.. .. [T]he Board met five times before approving the original KERP."); Dickerson, supra note
12, at 97-103.
46. See Paul R. Hage, Key Employee Retention Plans under BAPCPA? Is There Anything Left?,
17 J. BANKR. L. & PRAc. 1, 15 (2008) ("[S]ection 503(c) prohibits payments to an insider 'for the
purpose of inducing such person to remain with the debtor's business."'). The BAPCPA mostly affected
consumer bankruptcy, and the reform studied in this Article was one of the handful of provisions that
altered business bankruptcy in a significant way.
47. In re Global Home Prods., L.L.C., 369 B.R. 778, 783-84 (Bankr. D. Del. 2007) (quoting
Karen Lee Turner & Ronald S. Gellert, Dana Hits a Roadblock: Why Post-BAPCPA Laws May Impose
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were only allowed to authorize Chapter 11 debtors to pay "incentive"
bonuses, typically through a formal "Key Employee Incentive Plan"
("KEIP").48 In theory, KEIPs tie any bonus payments to the achievement of
challenging performance goals, such as improving the firm's financial
performance or attaining a milestone in the bankruptcy process like
confirming a plan of reorganization.49 As a result, bankruptcy judges found
themselves with the challenging new task of evaluating proposed bonus
plans to determine if they were permissible incentive plans or "disguised
retention plans" that did not actually challenge management.o
Consider a hypothetical bonus plan that pays an executive if the firm's
revenue increases by 10 percent. Is this an incentive plan or a retention
plan? The answer turns on how likely it is for that anticipated revenue
increase to occur.51 An executive who commits to such a plan may very
well have private information regarding an imminent sale to a major
Stricter KERP Standards, 3 BANKR. LITIG. REP. 2, 2 (2006)); see also Edward E. Neiger, Bankruptcy
Courts Continue to Approve Performance-Based Bonuses for Executives of Companies in Chapter 11, 3
PRATT'S J. BANKR. L. 356, 357 (2007).
48. See 11 U.S.C. § 503 (2018); In re Dana Corp., 358 B.R. 567, 575-78 (summarizing the
changes to the Bankruptcy Code); Skeel, supra note 12, at 928 (describing KEIPs). In sample cases, it is
very clear that-in at least some instances-the KELP was designed more with a view to what the court
would approve than what actually needed to provide incentive compensation to senior executives. For
example, in the bankruptcy of Nortel, the debtor's compensation consultant examined other recent
KEIPs and provided its senior managers with a maximum number of how much money could be
distributed in bonuses and how many people could be paid, and this was used to generate an incentive
plan. See Declaration of John Dempsey in Support Debtors' Motion for an Order Seeking Approval of
Key Emp. Retention Plan and Key Exec. Incentive Plan, and Certain Other Related Relief at 5, In re
Nortel Networks Inc., 426 B.R. 84 (Bankr. D. Del. Feb. 27, 2009) (No. 09-10138) [hereinafter Dempsey
Declaration].
In determining the appropriate number of employees eligible, maximum program cost, and
the size of awards to be granted, I reviewed Key Employee Incentive Plans that had been
approved by bankruptcy courts in a number of recent chapter 11 cases. The companies for
which these plans were approved reflect entities both inside and outside the technology sector
as well as companies facing multi-jurisdictional issues, including SemGroup LLP, Quebecor
World, Delphi Corporation, Dura Automotive, and Calpine Corporation.
Id. In Dempsey's defense, Nortel was a large firm and the compared firms, albeit engaged in entirely
different lines of business and headquartered in different cities, were also large firms. Nonetheless, the
selection of compared firms is curious. In terms of the number of managers, he testified, "I advised
Nortel management to select participants that would result in a population of employees totaling
approximately 5% of the aggregate Nortel population, as this amount was well within the range of
competitive market practice." Id.
49. See Skeel, supra note 12, at 928 ("[C]reditors have insisted in recent cases that the managers'
compensation be tied to the company's progress under Chapter 11. The most straightforward strategy
for rewarding managers who handle the case expeditiously is to base their compensation, at least in
part, on the speed of the reorganization.").
50. See Hage, supra note 46, at 22-27 (discussing the early decisions); see also Revich, supra
note 4, at 94.
51. See In re Velo Holdings Inc., 472 B.R. 201, 211 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012) (analyzing a
proposed KELP plan to insure the targets are "difficult to achieve").
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
customer that will yield the 10 percent increase, making the incentive plan
a "disguised retention plan" that rewards the manager for remaining
employed without requiring extra effort and accomplishment to earn the
bonus.52 On the other hand, in some cases a 10 percent increase in revenue
could be highly unlikely and something management can only achieve with
extra effort.53 How can one proposed bonus plan be distinguished from
another? In the seminal case interpreting the 2005 reform, Judge Burton I.
Lifland of the Southern District of New York declared "if it walks like a
duck (KERP) and quacks like a duck (KERP), it's a duck (KERP)."
54
Judge Lifland also identified several factors that bankruptcy courts
should analyze to determine if a proposed bonus plan creates challenging
incentive bonuses or disguised retention bonuses:
Is there a reasonable relationship between the plan proposed and the
results to be obtained, i.e., will the key employee stay for as long as it
takes for the debtor to reorganize or market its assets, or, in the case of a
performance incentive, is the plan calculated to achieve the desired
performance?
Is the cost of the plan reasonable in the context of the debtor's assets,
liabilities and earning potential?
Is the scope of the plan fair and reasonable; does it apply to all
employees; does it discriminate unfairly?
Is the plan or proposal consistent with industry standards?
What were the due diligence efforts of the debtor in investigating the
need for a plan; analyzing which key employees need to be incentivized;
what is available; what is generally applicable in a particular industry?
Did the debtor receive independent counsel in performing due diligence
and in creating and authorizing the incentive compensation?
55
To summarize, the 2005 reform is best understood as creating new
responsibilities for Chapter 11 debtors, the bankruptcy judges, and the
Department of Justice's United States Trustee Program, while providing
new bargaining power for creditors. Prior to the reform, a Chapter 11
debtor could easily obtain a judge's permission to pay bonuses by
demonstrating a plausible business justification.56 After the reform, Chapter
52. See LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 26, at 694 ("Management also gains considerable power
by being better informed than other interested parties.").
53. Of course, in some cases a 10% revenue increase can result from changed market conditions
or political developments that improve the firm's prospects with no increased effort from managers.
54. In re Dana Corp., 351 B.R. 96, 102 n.3 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006).
55. In re Dana Corp, 358 B.R. 567, 576-77 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006) (emphasis in original)
(internal citations omitted).
56. See Revich, supra note 4, at 116.
[Vol. 92:653666
REGULA TING BANKRUPTCYBONUSES
11 debtors can only pay bonuses if they convince a judge that a proposed
bonus plan requires management o demonstrate extra effort and skill. The
standard developed in the Dana Corp., and re-articulated above, requires
the debtor to present evidence of industry and firm practices to demonstrate
the reasonableness of the overall level of compensation, as well as the
structure that would trigger the payment of bonuses. In making this case,
Chapter 11 debtors typically present the testimony of an independent
compensation consultant that helped to develop the incentive plan. The
judge then must weigh significantly more evidence and make more
findings of fact than was the case prior to the 2005 reform. This new
bargaining dynamic empowers creditors, who can investigate a proposed
bonus plan, file an objection, and negotiate to change the plan in the
shadow of the objection.57
II. THEORETICAL PROBLEMS WITH THE 2005 REFORM
This Part describes theoretical flaws that undermine the bankruptcy
system's then-newfound mandate to police executive compensation in
bankruptcy. These flaws lead to three testable hypotheses about the reform,
which are respectively analyzed using empirical evidence in Section III.B.
As a general rule, laws that leave gaps create incentives for regulatory
evasion.58 The 2005 reform only affects bonuses paid through court-
approved bonus plans in Chapter 11. This narrow scope allows firms to
simply sidestep the regulation by paying managers prior to filing for
bankruptcy or waiting until a Chapter 11 case ends to adjust management's
compensation retroactively. Indeed, the reform likely created financial
incentives for firms to engage in evasion, as the additional work that law
firms need to do to meet the new standard is costly.
Accordingly, hypothesis one is that firms will respond to the increased
costs of proposing a bankruptcy bonus plan by evading the new regulation
and paying managers through channels unaffected by the 2005 reform.59
Further, the reform places bankruptcy judges in the challenging
position of distinguishing permissible incentive plans from forbidden
retention plans. To do so, judges must assess ex ante the likelihood that a
triggering event will occur. If a performance goal is likely to occur without
additional managerial effort, the judge should reject it as a disguised
57. See Bharath et al., supra note 10, at 24 (suggesting the use of KERPs contribute to more
equitable Chapter 11 outcomes, as measured by the frequency of Absolute Priority Deviations).
58. See, e.g., Victor Fleischer, Regulatory Arbitrage, 89 TEX. L. REV. 227, 278-80 (2010).
59. For evidence supporting this hypothesis surveyed, see generally infra Section III.B. I.
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retention plan that rewards management for remaining employed. This is a
difficult analysis. The boards of directors and managers that develop bonus
plans presumably know their businesses better than the judge, placing the
judge at a disadvantage in evaluating a bonus plan. Further, judges are
bankruptcy lawyers and lack subject-matter expertise in executive
compensation, let alone specific knowledge of the firm's industry.
Moreover, even in a world with perfect information, the judge would still
struggle to perform this analysis because the line between retention and
incentive plans is very thin. All incentive plans have some retentive
element, as employees often remain in jobs to earn promised bonuses.
60
Therefore, hypothesis two is that bankruptcy judges are unlikely to be
able to screen out all but the most obviously disguised retention plans, and
the bonus plans that are approved are unlikely to be significantly different
in substance than the bonus plans prior to the reform.
6 1
The challenges that bankruptcy judges face are exacerbated by the
incentives that creditors have to use their bargaining power to police
executive compensation.62 One of the main reasons that executive
compensation theorists have long sought to empower investors with a
greater voice in determining executive pay is because of the belief that the
excess compensation paid to managers reduces the returns to investors.
63
Superficially, this is the case in Chapter 11 as well, as creditors are
generally the firm's residual claimant and thus the losers if the firm
overpays management. However, executive bonuses affect such a small
amount of value in large Chapter 11 cases-single-digit millions when the
firm's assets can potentially be worth billions-that we would expect
creditors might decline to spend the time and money required to actively
police executive compensation.
Further, the bankruptcy judge is unlikely to get much help from the
Department of Justice's U.S. Trustee Program. In theory, the Department
of Justice only has incentives to enforce bankruptcy law, and the 2005
reform created a new Congressional policy of policing abuses in executive
60. See Margaret Howard, The Law of Unintended Consequences, 31 S. ILL. U. L.J. 451, 456
(2007); Allison K. Verderber Herriott, Toward an Understanding of the Dialectical Tensions Inherent
in CEO and Key Employee Retention Plans During Bankruptcy, 98 Nw. U. L. REV. 579, 615 (2004);
Revich, supra note 4, at 112 (considering Judge Lifland's decision in In re Dana Corp., which noted
permissible incentive plans may have retentive effects).
61. For evidence supporting this hypothesis surveyed, see infra Section 1II.B.2.
62. Economic theory has long held that people respond to incentives. E.g., Gary S. Becker,
Irrational Behavior and Economic Theory, 70 J. POL. ECON. 1, 9 (1962).
63. Karen Dillon, The Coming Battle over Executive Pay, HARV. Bus. REV. (2009),
https://hbr.org/2009/09/the-coming-battle-over-executive-pay.
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compensation. In practice, the U.S. Trustee suffers from the same
informational asymmetries and expertise deficits that limit a judge's
effectiveness in evaluating a proposed bonus plan. The 2005 reform did not
provide extra money to hire compensation experts to help the lawyers in
the U.S. Trustee's office analyze proposed bonus plans.
Accordingly, hypothesis three is that the bankruptcy judges are
unlikely to receive much help from creditors and the U.S. Trustee.
Creditors have weak incentives, on average, to invest the time and
resources required to police executive compensation aggressively. The U.S.
Trustee lacks the necessary expertise to perform the role assigned to it by
Congress.64
III. EVIDENCE OF DESIGN PROBLEMS IN THE 2005 REFORM
Part III presents an account of the flaws that undermine the 2005
reform. Section III.A first describe the data gathering methodology and the
sample of bankruptcy cases. In Section III.B, evidence from the empirical
study tests the hypotheses developed in Part II.
A. SAMPLE AND DATA GATHERING
To study the reform, I gathered two samples of data: (1) a large
sample that represents the population of large companies that filed for
Chapter 11 between 2001 and 2012 with traded debt or equity and (2) a
smaller case study sample of cases from before and after the statutory
change to examine bonus plans (and bankruptcy litigation) in a more
comprehensive and detailed way. Both samples are drawn from Next
Generation Research's list of large company bankruptcies from 2001 to
2012.65 I describe the construction of the large sample and the case study
sample in turn.
The large sample consists of all large companies from Next
Generation Research's list of large company bankruptcies from 2001 to
2012 that traded debt or equity. I focus on firms with publicly traded debt
or equity because those firms have obligations to file disclosures with the
Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC"), so information on firm
compensation practices are available. Nearly all of the largest firms to file
64. For evidence supporting this hypothesis surveyed, see infra Section III.B.3.
65. See generally Data & Research, BANKR. DATA, http://bankruptcydata.com/p/data-research
(last visited Apr. 8, 2019). Next Generation Research's Bankruptcy Data service is a commonly used
data source for empirical bankruptcy studies. Accord, e.g., Kenneth M. Ayotte & Edward R. Morrison,
Creditor Control and Conflict in Chapter 11, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 511, 517 (2009).
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for bankruptcy have traded debt or equity, and this larger sample is very
close to the population of large companies that restructured their debt in
Chapter 11 court proceedings between January 1, 2001 and December 31,
2012.
I identified the firms included in the larger sample through the
following procedure.66 For each of the 1,998 large firms that filed for
Chapter 11 bankruptcy between 2001 and 2012, I looked for matches in the
list of debt or equity issued by large firms that traded in the databases kept
by TRACE, Marklt, and Bloomberg.67 For example, if I found that a firm
filed for bankruptcy on January 3, 2003, I looked for trades in that firm's
debt or equity entered on or after that date. This larger sample consists of
408 cases. For each of the firms in the sample, I collected extensive
information about the firm and the bankruptcy case from the court docket
and important pleadings. Most importantly, I recorded whether the firm
sought judicial approval of a bankruptcy bonus plan and identified which,
if any, bonus plans were approved by the bankruptcy judge. For all of these
firms, I also examined their securities filings to obtain additional
information on how the firm historically compensated its executives.
68
I collected the case study sample using a similar method. I again
began with the list of all firms listed in Next Generation Research's
database of corporate bankruptcies, including those without traded debt or
equity.69 The case study sample comes from two time periods. First, I
collected a "before" sample of every large bankruptcy case from Next
66. A portion of this larger sample was used previously in Jared A. Ellias, What Drives
Bankruptcy Forum Shopping? Evidence from Market Data, 47 J. LEGAL STUD. 119, 124-26 (2018). I
provide greater detail regarding construction of the larger sample. While this Article shares basic
information on bankruptcy cases with that larger dataset, the data on executive compensation presented
here were collected specifically for this project and are unique and new.
67. "TRACE" is a complete record of all buying and selling of corporate bonds, with transaction-
level data on all trades during the sample period. It is the standard source for bond data in empirical
finance literature. "MarkIt" is a data provider that compiles trading in corporate loans. Bloomberg
maintains records in trading of both listed and over-the-counter equity. I do not report results using
TRACE, MarkIt, or Bloomberg data in this Article.
68. Firms generally disclose executive compensation as part of their annual report or proxy
statements for their annual meeting. See Fast Answers: Executive Compensation, U.S. SEC. &
EXCHANGE COMM'N, https://www.sec.gov/fast-answers/answers-execomphtm.html (last visited Apr. 8,
2019) ("The easiest place to look up information on executive pay is probably the annual proxy
statement. Annual reports on Form 10-K and registration statements might simply refer you to the
information in the annual proxy statement, rather than presenting the information directly.").
69. This means that the case study sample is drawn from a slightly broader universe than the
larger sample, which is restricted to public firms with traded claims. I do not believe this introduces bias
into the analysis, and it avoids any bias that could result from looking only at public firms. The results




Generation Research's list of large corporate bankruptcies that filed
between January 1, 2004 and April 20, 2005, the date that BAPCPA was
signed into law by President George W. Bush. I begin with January 1,
2004, because older dockets are generally no longer available on the Public
Access to Court Electronic Records database ("PACER"). The initial
sample consisted of 140 potential Chapter 11 debtors, of which forty-one
(approximately 30%) sought judicial approval for a key employee retention
or incentive plan. These forty-one Chapter 11 debtors constitute the pre-
BAPCPA sample, which I term the "pre-reform" or "pre-2005 reform"
sample.
The second case study sample period consists of all firms that filed for
Chapter 11 bankruptcy between January 1, 2009 and December 31, 2010
that implemented bankruptcy bonus plans. I choose a period four years
after the reform because it took several court decisions to settle on a legal
standard for adjudicating proposed post-reform incentive plans and lawyers
needed time to develop customs to meet that standard.70 I began with the
list of 375 large bankruptcy cases and examined each court docket to look
for a proposed bonus plan. The final sample consists of fifty-seven bonus
plans filed by debtors that filed for bankruptcy in 2009 and 2010.71
I studied each case in the case study sample very closely. In addition
to examining the docket and acquiring basic information from court filings,
I examined all objections filed by creditors and the United States Trustee to
managements' motions seeking approval of bonus plans. I also compared
the bonus plans approved by the court to the original bonus plans to track
changes made over the course of the bargaining process. Next, I examined
the goals created by the plans and used the date of bankruptcy events, the
disclosure statement and subsequent securities disclosures, news stories,
and press releases to determine whether management achieved the
incentive payout.
Finally, I examined all of the legal bills filed by the debtor's counsel
for the period between the petition date and the bonus plan being approved
by the court. When large firms are in Chapter 11 bankruptcy, they ask for
(and receive) a court order allowing them to retain a law firm to help them
70. In re Dana Corp, 358 B.R. 567, 576-77 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006) (emphasis in original).
(internal citations omitted); see also supra note 55 and accompanying text.
71. One possible complaint about my methodology is that the 2009 and 2010 "post-reform"
sample includes the bankruptcy cases that resulted from the financial crisis. The broad conclusions from
the study come from the larger sample. The case study sample is used mostly to illustrate problems with
the reform, provide institutional detail, and estimate the increase in costs, which should not be affected
by the financial crisis and its aftermath.
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with their bankruptcy.72 The Chapter 11 debtor then submits its law firm's
legal bills to the court and asks for permission to pay them.
73 The Federal
Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure require a detailed statement of the time the
attorneys spent on the firm's legal problems, which in practice translates to
the full record of all time charged to the client. I oversaw a team of
research assistants that worked together to identify the amount and value of
time that law firms spent on bonus plans for both time periods in the case
study sample. I provide an illustrative example of this analysis in the
Appendix. To my knowledge, this is a new method in the bankruptcy
practice literature, and a very labor-intensive one, but it holds significant
promise in terms of aiding our understanding of bankruptcy costs.
B. ASSESSING EVIDENCE OF DESIGN FLAWS IN THE 2005 REFORM
The 2005 reform aimed to reduce public outrage over bankruptcy
bonuses, force managers to earn their pay, and reduce the overall level of
executive compensation. Section III.B uses evidence from the sample to
test the hypotheses developed in Part H. In general, I begin with the high-
level portrait painted by the larger sample, test for obvious confounding
explanations of the findings using regression analysis, and then look
closely at the case study sample to reveal a more detailed picture.
1. Assessing the Effect of the Reform: Evidence of Higher Costs and
Regulatory Evasion.
Hypothesis one predicts that the reform will increase the costs
associated with bankruptcy bonus plans and lead to regulatory evasion. I
begin by assessing the impact of the reform on bankruptcy costs before
moving on to the observed frequency of bonus plans and evidence that
points to rampant regulatory evasion.
a. The Effect of the Reform on Bankruptcy Costs
As a threshold matter, by requiring the debtor's counsel to do extra
work to approve a bonus plan, the 2005 reform and Dana Corp. may have
increased the costs of bankruptcy.74 To estimate the size of the increase, I
72. 11 U.S.C. § 327 (2018).
73. See First Verified Monthly Application of Alston & Bird LLP as Counsel for the Debtors and
Debtors-in-Possession for Allowance of Compensation and Reimbursement of Expenses Incurred for
the Interim Period June 22, 2009 through July 31, 2009 at 2, In re Sea Launch Company, No. 09-12153
(Bankr. D. Del. Aug. 25, 2009); see also FED. R. BANKR. P. 2016(a) (providing for the compensation of
services provided to the debtor by professionals).
74. Others have speculated that the new, post-reform statutory regime requires more attorney
time and expense. See Jonathan C. Lipson, Where's the Beef? A Few Words About Paying for
Performance in Bankruptcy, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 64, 68 (2007).
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reviewed all of the debtor's counsel's bills and identified the time entries
corresponding to work on a bankruptcy bonus plan. Pre-reform, the median
debtor's counsel billed $30,484 (mean of $65,198) for work on a
bankruptcy bonus plan in constant 2010 U.S. dollars.75 Post-reform, the
median debtor's counsel billed $86,411 (mean of $140,218) for their work
on their debtor's bonus plans, an increase of 64%. For comparison's sake,
the debtor's counsel's bill for the entire bankruptcy case was $5,191,576 in
the post-reform sample, as compared to $3,449,969 pre-reform--an
increase of 33%. The costs associated with a bankruptcy bonus plan grew
twice as fast as the debtor's counsel's fees as a whole, suggesting that the
new standard significantly increased the amount of legal work the debtor's
attorneys needed to do to comply. 76
75. All of the nominal dollar amounts in the bills were adjusted to 2010 dollars using the
Consumer Price Index.
76. In Appendix Table 1, 1 use regression analysis to try to verify that the observed fee increase
is not due to a difference in observable firm characteristics between the population of pre-reform
Chapter 11 debtors and post-reform Chapter 11 debtors. The results suggest that, controlling for firm
financial characteristics and industry, the 2005 bankruptcy reform is associated with a 118% increase in
the debtor's fees for time spent on bonus plans, a 102% increase in attorney's hours devoted to the
bonus plan, and a 110% increase in the percentage of the total bill for the case devoted to matters
related to the bankruptcy bonus plan.
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did 2007.17 I cannot eliminate the possibility that a composition effect
drives the shift observed in Figure 1, although it seems unlikely that this
would be the whole explanation. I can, however, control for some
observable firm characteristics in a regression analysis to test the
robustness of the observed post-reform decline in the utilization of
bankruptcy bonus plans, specifically by controlling for firm size, industry,
and the debtor's law firm.
77. Some firms may be more likely to enact bonus plans if, for example, a large part of their pre-
bankruptcy compensation was in the form of stock that is unlikely to be worth anything after
bankruptcy. Thus, it is possible that a composition effect drives the effect in Figure 1, if the cohort of
Chapter 11 debtors pre-reform were firms that used more stock compensation than the cohort that came
afterwards. I addressed the question of pre-bankruptcy compensation practices further in supra Part I.
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TABLE 1. Bonus Plan Proposal and Approval After the 2005 Reform
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Bonus Plan Bonus Plan Bonus Plan Bonus Plan Bonus Plan Bonus Plan
Proposed Proposed Approved Approved Proposed Approved
Post-
BAPCPA -1.372*** -1.968*** -1.243*** -1.684*** -0.234*** -0.309***
Filing (0.224) (0.287) (0.219) (0.278) (0.054) (0.054)
N 409 388 409 408 445 408
Psuedo-R2 0.07 0.27 0.06 0.24 0.24 0.24
Firm
Financial
Controls No Yes No Yes No No
Industry
FE No Yes No Yes No No
Law Firm
FE No Yes No Yes No No
Propensity
Score
Matching No No Yes No Yes Yes
Notes: Table 1 displays logistic regression coefficients with robust standard errors in
parenthesis. Firm financial controls include firm size. Industry fixed effects are Fama-
French 12. Law firm fixed effects are indicator variables for the type of law firm advising
the debtor on its reorganization: (1) national law firms with elite national bankruptcy
practices, as ranked by Chambers and Partners (where "Band 1" firms in 2014 are
considered elite practices); (2) full-service large New York based law firms listed in the
American Lawyer list of the 250 largest law firms in 2014 that do not have "Band 1"
bankruptcy practices; (3) full-service large law firms based anywhere but New York,
listed on the American Lawyer list of the top 250 law firms in 2014; and (4) firms not
listed in the American Lawyer list of 250 largest law firms. The propensity score models
are estimated using nearest neighbor matching on firm size, law firm, and industry and are
included as a robustness check of the main result.
Table 1 displays those regression results. In Models 1, 2, and 3, I
regress a dummy variable for post-2005 reform filing on the likelihood of a
bonus plan being proposed, with the second Model adding control
variables. In Models 4, 5, and 6, I instead study the likelihood that a bonus
plan is approved. In the cases of both proposal and approval, the results are
the same: controlling for firm characteristics, firms become less likely to
implement bankruptcy bonus plans after the 2005 reform.
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c. The Effect of the Reform on the Overall Level of Executive
Compensation
Given that proportionately fewer firms used court-approved bonus
plans, it is possible that the overall level of executive compensation was
reduced by the reform. To the extent the pre-reform equilibrium was
characterized by managerial rent extraction, the reform might have
eliminated some opportunistic retention bonus plans that effectively
overcompensated managers.
While I am not able to measure overcompensation, I can look for
evidence of a change in the level of compensation that managers receive
before and after the 2005 reform. I take two approaches to doing so. First,
for a subset of the large sample with available data, I calculate the
percentage change in CEO compensation in the year prior to bankruptcy
and the year the firm filed for bankruptcy.78 This facilitates comparison of
bankruptcy-period compensation to pre-bankruptcy-period compensation,
controlling for the firm's historic level of compensation.
Second, to make sure that industry changes do not bias the analysis, I
adjust each firm's observed CEO compensation to control for the firm's
industry. For each firm in the sample, I identify the firm's industry using its
three digit SIC code. I then use the ExecuComp dataset to identify S&P
1,500 firms in the same industry as each sample firm to understand how the
sample firm's compensation compared to its industry peers. I then
calculated a percentile ranking that reflects how the Chapter 11 debtor
compared to its peers in each observed calendar year. So, for example, a
firm in the 90th percentile in terms of compensation is a firm that paid their
CEO more than 90% of all other firms in the same industry.
78. For example, if a firm's CEO was paid $100 in the year before bankruptcy and $120 in the
year the firm filed for bankruptcy, the test statistic is ($120-$100)/$100, or 12%.
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TABLE 2. Industry-Adjusted Bankruptcy Compensation, Before and
After the 2005 Reform
(1) (2) (3)
Percentage Percentage Percentage (4) (5)
Change in Change in Change in Change in Change in
Bankruptcy Bankruptcy Bankruptcy Industry Industry
Compensation Compensation Compensation Compensation Compensation
Compared to Compared to Compared to Percentile, Percentile,
Pre- Pre- Pre- Pre- Pre-
Bankruptcy Bankruptcy Bankruptcy Bankruptcy vs. Bankruptcy vs.












































Effects No No Yes No No
* p<O.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.
Notes: This table displays ordinary least squares regression with robust standard errors in
parenthesis. For Models 1-3, the dependent variable is the percentage change in CEO
compensation, pre-bankruptcy versus the first year of bankruptcy. For Models 4-5, the
dependent variable is the difference in intra-industry compensation percentile, pre-
bankruptcy versus the first year of bankruptcy. The intra-industry compensation percentile
is the percentile ranking of how a firm's overall level of compensation compares to its
industry peers (as identified by the firm's three digit SIC code) on the S&P 1500. By way
of illustration, if an automaker's CEO compensation puts it at the 60th percentile in terms
of automakers, it implies that the automaker pays better than 60% of automakers but less
money than 40%, or slightly above average compensation. "Log Pre-Bankruptcy CEO
Compensation to Revenue Ratio" is the ratio of the firm's CEO compensation over the
firm's pre-bankruptcy revenue, a control for the amount of the firm's resources it
dedicates to the CEO's compensation package. Industry fixed effects for Model 3 are
Fama-French 12.
As Table 2 shows, I fail to find any statistically significant effect
suggesting that the overall level of executive compensation in bankruptcy
was altered by the reform. To be sure, my failure to find this relationship
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does not mean there is not one. This analysis is conducted on a subset of
the sample firms highly constrained by data availability, and it is possible
that if the analysis included the missing firms the result would be
different.79 There may also be an omitted variable that would uncover an
otherwise hidden relationship. However, at the very least, the results
suggest that the lower rate of bonus plans might not have changed the
overall level of compensation of Chapter 11 executives, relative to pre-
bankruptcy compensation and industry trends.
d. Anecdotal Evidence of Regulatory Evasion
A potential explanation for this result is that firms may simply
sidestep court-approved bonus plans to engage in regulatory evasion. I
cannot offer comprehensive statistics on how frequently Chapter 11 debtors
utilize these strategies, as firms do not necessarily go out of their way to
disclose these strategies and are not necessarily required to do so. I also
cannot rule out the possibility that the observed change in bonus plan
utilization reflects improved governance of executive compensation.
However, I find extensive anecdotal evidence suggesting that many firms
are simply paying managers in ways that evade the judicial scrutiny
demanded by the reform. There are three main strategies to get around the
2005 reform: (1) adjusting compensation pre-bankruptcy; (2) paying
bonuses as part of other bankruptcy court orders that the 2005 reform does
not regulate; and (3) waiting until after the firm emerges from bankruptcy
to pay bankruptcy related-bonuses. I explain each strategy in turn.
First, the reform does not affect compensation adjustments that firms
made before filing for Chapter 11 bankruptcy, and some firms appear to
have taken advantage of this.80 A Chapter 11 debtor cannot simply pay
management a large bonus on the eve of bankruptcy, as doing so might
create an avoidable transfer that creditors could recover.81 However, at
79. The firms in Table 2 all had historic and bankruptcy-year compensation data publicly
available, either in securities filings or in the bankruptcy court documents that I reviewed to assemble
the sample. It is possible that the missing firms are non-randomly selected, so the results in this Section
should be interpreted cautiously. In general, firms tend to avoid disclosing executive compensation
numbers if they can, viewing it as a trade secret, so the firms in Table 2 tend to skew towards the largest
firms.
80. From the large sample, both OTC Holdings and Regent Communications engaged in this
type of planning. I studied both cases closely for my article, Do Activist Investors Constrain
Managerial Moral Hazard In Chapter 11?: Evidence from Junior Activist Investing, supra note 35.
Stumbling upon them-and their thoughtful and successful attempts to use bankruptcy planning to
evade court review-inspired this project.
81. One law firm that represents many large debtors in bankruptcy expressly warned its clients
against this strategy, saying that it risked upsetting negotiations with creditors and created fraudulent
conveyance risk. Sprayregen et al., supra note 21. Anecdotal evidence suggests that this practice is both
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least some firms implemented bankruptcy-related bonus plans prior to
filing for Chapter 11 that were overt and open attempts to evade the 2005
reform. For example, OTC Holdings, a manufacturer of party supplies and
children's toys, set up a Key Employee Performance Incentive Plan
("KEPIP") to "align the interests of OTC's key employees with the
interests of OTC and its creditors" prior to the firm's bankruptcy petition.
82
This plan was designed to pay bonuses only after the firm emerged from
bankruptcy, which, the firm argued, meant that the Bankruptcy Code's
restrictions on executive bonuses would not apply to the incentive plan.
83
Similarly, the board of directors of Regent Communications implemented a
"Special Bonus Plan ... [which] was triggered upon commencement of the
Chapter 11 Cases," suggesting that OTC is, at the very least, not the only
firm that engaged in this sort of bankruptcy planning.
84
Second, some firms simply "bundled" bankruptcy bonus plans with
other, more important motions to evade close court monitoring of
bankruptcy-related compensation." When large firms file for bankruptcy,
they usually also file a variety of intermediate motions while they try to
reorganize their business-a motion for a bonus plan is an example of such
an intermediate motion-before filing a proposed plan of reorganization for
the approval of the bankruptcy judge. The plan of reorganization is a
lengthy document that contains hundreds of provisions that describe how
the firm will leave bankruptcy, how it will pay its creditors, and what the
post-bankruptcy life of the company will be. Bankruptcy law instructs the
judge to evaluate this document under section 1129 of the Bankruptcy
Code.86 The approval of this document will normally end the bankruptcy
common and continuing to this day. See Andrew Scurria, Takata Insiders Took in Millions Before
Bankruptcy, WALL ST. J. PRO: BANKR. (Aug. 10, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/takata-insiders-
took-in-millions-before-bankruptcy-1 502405497.
82. Disclosure Statement Under 11 U.S.C. § 1125 in Support of the Debtors' Third Amended
Joint Plan of Reorganization at 26-27, In re OTC Holdings Corp., No. 10-12636 (Bankr. D. Del. Nov.
2, 2010), ECF No. 263.
83. See id.
84. First Amended Disclosure Statement for the First Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization for
Regent Commc'ns Corp., et al. at 24, In re Regent Commc'ns, Inc., No. 10-10632 (Bankr. D. Del. Mar.
22, 2010), ECF No. 128. A third non-case study sample, the 2009-2010 Chapter II of CCS Medical,
involved similar bankruptcy planning and similarly allowed management to be paid bankruptcy-related
bonuses without a judge finding that the plan satisfied the revised statute. See Transcript of Hearing re
Debtors' Motion for Order (a) Approving Bidding Procedures in Connection with Mktg. and Proposed
Sale of Substantially All of the Debtors' Assets, and (b) Granting Related Relief at 37-38, In re CCS
Medical, Inc., No. 09-12390 (Bankr. D. Del. Nov. 23, 2009), ECF No. 673.
85. Importantly, I only count bankruptcy bonuses that are bundled with the plan of
reorganization and pay cash consideration as part of the analysis in this paragraph.
86. See II U.S.C. § 1129 (2018).
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case and allow the firm to emerge as a restructured company. Adding a
retroactive bankruptcy bonus plan into this document is as simple as adding
a single line of text.
By "bundling" the executive bonus plan with the larger plan of
reorganization, a Chapter 11 debtor can evade the scrutiny that comes when
the bonus plan is squarely before the court. This strategy also puts the
judge in a difficult position, as it creates a choice between approving the
plan of reorganization (with the bundled executive bonus plan) or rejecting
the plan, when rejecting the plan might mean forcing the company to
remain in bankruptcy with unknown costs for the business and its
employees.
As such, it should not be surprising that "bundling" was the most
commonly observed regulatory evasion strategy. For example, in the
bankruptcy of Journal Register, management abandoned an attempt to
obtain judicial approval of a bankruptcy bonus plan after the pension fund
objected. But management did not abandon the goal of paying itself for
bankruptcy-related performance. Instead, the company bundled a
"bankruptcy emergence bonus" into the plan of reorganization, which, it
reasoned, was governed by a different part of the Bankruptcy Code than
section 503(c).87 In evaluating this attempt at bundling, the court first noted
that the debtors "filed a motion during the cases for approval of the
Incentive Plan, but thereafter withdrew that motion and incorporated the
Incentive Plan in the Reorganization Plan."" However, the court also
pointed out that the plan process involved creditor voting and the
creditors-whose money was going to the executives-supported the
plan.89 Accordingly, the judge approved the payment of the bonuses.90
87. See In re Journal Register Co., 407 B.R. 520, 527, 537 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) (noting the
court agreed that the confirmation of a plan is governed by section 1129, not section 503(c), of the
Bankruptcy Code).
88. Id. at 535.
89. Id. at 528, 537.
90. Id. at 538. In collecting data for Ellias, supra note 35, 1 observed other firms engage in
similar behavior without first seeking court approval of a bonus plan. For example, Caraustar Industries
paid management 50% of its 2009 incentive compensation on the effective date of the plan of
reorganization. See Disclosure Statement for Debtors' Joint Plan of Reorganization at 40, In re
Caraustar Indus., Inc., No. 09-73830 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. May 31, 2009), ECF No. 21. Orleans
Homebuilders paid $2.3 million in bonuses to forty senior managers as part of its plan of
reorganization. See Debtor's Second Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization at 44, In re Orleans
Homebuilders, Inc., 561 BR. 46 (Bankr. D. Del. 2010) (No. 10-10684). Other firms paying large
bonuses as part of the plan-presumably for performance during the bankruptcy case-that filed for
bankruptcy in 2009 and 2010 include: Lyondell Chemical Company ($27.75 million); Reader's Digest
Association ($12.9 million); Visteon Corporation ($8.1 million for twelve managers); Mesa Air Group;
Inc. ($5.5 million); Six Flags, Inc. ($5.025 million for seven managers); Innkeepers USA Trust ($4.5
2019] 681
682 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92:653
Finally, a third strategy to evade court monitoring of bankruptcy-
related executive compensation is deferring bonuses for bankruptcy-related
conduct for the post-bankruptcy board of directors.
91 Once a firm leaves
bankruptcy, it is no longer under judicial supervision and can pay its
employees however much it wants. As such, boards of directors can
sidestep the 2005 reform by promising management a bonus that is never
formally contracted for or paid until the firm emerges from bankruptcy.
While post-bankruptcy executive compensation is, by definition, hard
to survey in detail, I did observe strange behavior in the bankruptcy of
Citadel Broadcastings, a radio station conglomerate that filed for
bankruptcy in late 2009.92 Citadel proposed a plan of reorganization that,
like most cases in the sample, included setting aside a percentage of the
firm's post-reorganization equity for managers.
93  This plan of
million); Almatis B.V. ($4.3 million); Tronox Incorporated ($3 million for four managers); Cooper-
Standard Holdings, Inc. ($2.49 million for thirteen managers); Orleans Homebuilders, Inc. ($2.38
million for forty managers); NTK Holdings, Inc. (Nortek, Inc.) ($2 million); FairPoint
Communications, Inc. ($1.8 million); Journal Register Company ($1.7 million); Affiliated Media, Inc.
($1.6 million for fifty employees); Centaur, L.L.C. ($1.5 million for three managers); Great Atlantic &
Pacific Tea Company, Inc. ($1.48 million for 146 managers); Panolam Industries International, Inc.
($1 million); EnviroSolutions Holdings, Inc. ($1 million); Pliant Corporation ($0.87 million for one
manager), International Aluminum Corporation ($0.65 million); Newark Group, Inc. ($0.5 million);
Oriental Trading Company, Inc. ($0.45 million for fourteen managers); Neff Corp. ($0.35 million for
two managers); and Regent Communications, Inc. ($0.31 million).
91. Congress has long recognized the need for public disclosure of post-bankruptcy
compensation and retention of bankruptcy insiders. See, e.g., II U.S.C. § I I29(a)(5)(B) (2018)
(requiring disclosure of the identity of insiders who will be employed or retained by the debtor as well
as their compensation).
92. See Voluntary Petition (Chapter 11), In re Citadel Broadcasting Corp., No. 09-17442 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 2009).
93. Objection of Virtus Capital LLC and Kenneth S. Grossman Pension Plan to the Disclosure
Statement for the Joint Plan of Reorganization of Citadel Broadcasting Corp. and Its Debtor Affiliates
Pursuant to Chapter 11 of the Bankr. Code at 4-5, In re Citadel Broadcasting Corp., No. 09-17442
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Mar. 5, 2010), ECF No. 172. Post-bankruptcy equity incentive plans are largely
outside the scope of this study because of data constraints. While I often observe firms setting aside
post-reorganization equity for a management incentive plan as part of the plan of reorganization, I do
not systematically observe the post-bankruptcy payouts. Citadel is an outlier case because it involved
management misrepresenting the post-bankruptcy incentive plan to the court, with creditors learning
about it and seeking some sort of remedy. The vast majority of Chapter 11 debtors do not become
publicly traded immediately after bankruptcy; accordingly, there is little disclosure of post-bankruptcy
equity compensation. The value of post-bankruptcy equity compensation is substantial and dwarfs all
observed bankruptcy bonus plans (for the 2009 and 2010 sample, the aggregate amount of value in all
of the bonus plans in the case study sample is $70 million; those same firms set aside approximately
$387 million in aggregate management post-bankruptcy equity incentive plans). However, without
information on post-bankruptcy distributions and understanding how equity was allocated across the
employee base, it is impossible to determine how much of this equity actually flowed to management
and how much may have flowed to management as a form of compensation for performance while the
firm was in Chapter 11.
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reorganization was hotly contested by hedge fund creditors, who charged
that management was undervaluing the firm and going to profit in the form
of underpriced post-bankruptcy stock grants.94 In response to the criticism,
the CEO testified in court, "I have tried to get stock and each time I was
told I am getting options at market value ... [that] will vest one-third each
year on the anniversary from the time I got those options. So they will be
actually vest[ed] three years from now."95
The company thus dealt with the charge of self-dealing in an elegant
way. Instead of an outright stock grant, management received out-of-the-
money or market value stock options, which meant that management could
not use those stock grants to extract value that should have gone to
creditors. After hearing this testimony, the judge confirmed the plan of
reorganization.96
This testimony appears to have been forgotten shortly after the firm
exited bankruptcy. Less than a month after leaving Chapter 11, reorganized
Citadel distributed the stock in the form of restricted stock grants that
vested on a two-year schedule.97 The CEO alone received $55 million,
making him the highest paid manager in the history of the radio industry.98
These stock grants were only publicly disclosed due to Citadel's
obligations as an issuer of public debt. The disclosures caught the ire of the
activist investors who had lost in court at the confirmation hearing.99 They
filed a motion seeking to "prevent one of the most egregious frauds by a
company emerging from bankruptcy under Chapter 11."loo They noted that
this conduct was "fraudulent because Citadel representatives, including [the
CEO] himself, repeatedly told this Court, under oath, that they were not
getting under the Plan the very securities that they gave themselves only
weeks later immediately upon emergence [from bankruptcy.]"0 1
The Citadel Broadcasting Corp. case is an outlier, however. I have not
come across any other cases with similar facts. However, the 408 firms in
94. See id.
95. Reply of R2 Investments, LDC in Support of Motion Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 1142 and
105(a) to Direct Reorganized Debtors to Comply with Plan ¶ 5, In re Citadel Broadcasting Corp., No.
09-17442 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Oct. 29, 2010), ECF No. 507.
96. Motion Pursuant to 11 USC §§ 1142 and 105(a) to Direct Reorganized Debtors to Comply
with Plan at 2, In re Citadel Broadcasting Corp, No. 09-17442 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Oct. 6, 2010), ECF No.
498.
97. Id. at 3.
98. Id. at 2.
99. See id. 1-5.
100. Id. at 1.
101. Id. at 2.
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the large sample set aside more than $400 million in post-bankruptcy
equity for post-bankruptcy management incentive plans. To be sure, most
large companies have some sort of equity incentive plan, and it is entirely
in the ordinary course for companies to compensate managers with stock.
But other research has noted that creditors sometimes persuade managers to
support their incentive plan with lucrative post-bankruptcy employment
contracts.102 Thus, it remains an open question how often managers are
rewarded after the firm emerges from bankruptcy for conduct that took
place during bankruptcy.
2. Assessing the Limitations of the Bankruptcy Judge
As hypothesis two discussed above,103 bankruptcy judges suffer from
an informational asymmetry and lack of expertise that make it difficult for
them to make the determination that the 2005 reform wants them to-that a
bonus plan is an "incentive plan" with challenging goals and not a
"disguised retention plan." To assess this hypothesis, I first examine how
the structure of bonus plans changed after the reform and then determine
whether the post-2005 bonus plans are substantively different than the
retention plans that Congress banned.
102. Goldschmid, supra note 28, at 266-67.
103. See supra Part II.
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a. Changes in Bonus Plan Structure
TABLE 3. Bonus Plan Structure, Before and After the 2005 Reform
Post-2005 Sample (n=57) Pre-200S Sample (n-43)
N Mean Median N Mean Median
Panel A. Plan Summary Statistics
Number of Days Before
Proposal of Plan 57 78.00 54.00 43 120.77 0.00
Maximum Employees
Participating 47 202.79 25.00 42 67.52 34.50
Percentage of Total Employees
Participating 31 22.69% 1.11% 16 13.59% 2.89%
Senior Managers Participating 42 21.29 7.00 32 10.06 7.00
Percentage of Participants
Senior Managers 39 55.57% 43.18% 31 38.55% 23.81%
CEO Included (1/0)? 42 0.60 1 28 0.54
Maximum Bonus Pool Size
($)? 50 6,815,421 2,035,000 39 3,353,348 2,000,000
Pool Size as a % of debt 38 0.78% 0.58% 14 1.05% 0.96%
Pool Size as a % of assets 43 3.67% 0.53% 37 24.96% 1.30%
Panel B. Bonus Plan Pay-Out Events
EBITDA Target (0/1) 53 0.30 0 43 0.21 0
Revenue Target (0/1) 55 0.07 0 43 0.07 0
Cost Reduction Target (0/1) 55 0.11 0 43 0.00 0
Cash Target (0/1) 54 0.09 0 43 0.00 0
Production Target (0/1) 55 0.09 0 43 0.02 0
Creditor Recovery Target (0/1) 55 0.05 0 43 0.00 0
Any Operational Target (0/1) 57 0.46 0 43 0.23 0
Asset Sale Date Target (0/1) 55 0.24 0 43 0.14 0
Whole Firm Sale Date Target
(0/1) 54 0.31 0 43 0.38 0
Plan Confirmation Date Target
(0/1) 55 0.51 1 43 0.51 1
Emergence Date Target (0/1) 54 0.30 0 43 0.21 0
Bankmptcy Related Targets
(0/1) 57 0.86 1 43 0.86 1
Termination or Retention Pay-
out(0/1) 57 0.18 0 43 0.95 0
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Table 3 summarizes differences in the structure of bonus plans from
the case study sample before and after the reform. As Table 3 shows, the
reform clearly changed the structure of bankruptcy bonus plans.1
04 While
bonus plans did not appear to change much in terms of the amount of
money set aside for bonuses, the bonus plans after the reform are much
more likely to include some sort of operational or financial target that
rewards management for meeting specific performance objectives.
0 5
Bankruptcy-related objectives remain very popular, such as paying
management a bonus when the court confirms a plan of reorganization. But
in the post-reform era, approximately 20% of the plans with bankruptcy
"milestone" bonuses were tied to the specific milestone occurring by a
specific date, which makes them more challenging to accomplish.
b. Do the Post-Reform Bonus Plans Appear to Be Challenging
Incentive Plans?
Of course, these changes could very well be superficial.
Unfortunately, much like a bankruptcy judge, I cannot directly measure the
extent to which these plans created "truly incentivizing goals," because that
would require perfect knowledge of the facts and circumstances at the time
the bonus plan was adopted. Whether a revenue goal is challenging, for
example, would depend on observing the probability distribution of hitting
the revenue goal, which I obviously cannot do.
I can, however, examine theoretical predictions that indirectly capture
an aspect of how challenging the bonus plans would have been considered.
First, we would expect the post-reform plans to pay managers at a lower
rate than the pre-bankruptcy bonus plans, because challenging performance
goals are likely to be missed more often than the pre-bankruptcy retention
plans that rewarded managers for staying at their desks. Second, theory
would predict that, as the risk associated with a bonus increases, so too
should the size of the bonus, to compensate management for the increased
risk of not hitting the challenging goal. For example, a $100 bonus might
be an effective motivating tool if management knows there is a 100%
chance of receiving the payment. But if there is only a 10% chance of
104. An important limitation of the data is that in many cases, bonus plans were either incomplete
when filed with the court or filed under seal. Accordingly, Table 3 reports the information that was
publicly available both from bankruptcy court filings and from contemporaneous or post-bankruptcy
SEC filings that filled in gaps from the court filings.
105. This is consistent with anecdotal reports of practitioners. For example, a prominent creditor's
attorney told Bloomberg that "the amendment o the code changed the means, but not the value of these
plans . . . [i]t's just changed the way you get there, not necessarily how much management gets at the
end." Church, supra note 7.
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receiving the payment, management would need a much larger bonus to
provide the same motivation to perform.0 6  I assess each of these
predictions in turn.
TABLE 4. Incentive Plan Target Achievement Rate, Before and After the
2005 Reform
Post-2005 Reform Bonus Plan Pre-2005 Reform Bonus Plan
Targets Achieved? Targets Achieved?
Yes No Unknown Yes No Unknown
EBITDA
Targets? 18.75% 18.75% 62.5% 11.11% 33.33% 55.56%
Asset Sales
Targets? 69.23% 23.08% 7.69% 66.67% 33.33% N/A
Whole Firm
Sale Targets? 82.35% 11.76% 5.88% 37.5% 62.5% N/A
Plan
Confirmation
Targets? 60.71% 32.14% 7.14% 72.73% 27.27% N/A





pre-2005 era) 93.75% 6.25% N/A 88.89% 11.11% N/A
First, I analyzed every stated goal from every court-approved
bankruptcy bonus plan in the case study sample. I then used information
from the court docket and subsequent public information (such as securities
filings) to determine whether the bonus plan paid out. 107 As Table 4 shows,
106. In expectation, the expected value of $100 in the future that will be received with 100%
certainty is $100 ($100*100%). If management only has a 10% chance of receiving the bonus, in
expectation that bonus is worth $10 ($100*10%). Thus, the board would need to propose a bonus plan
that paid $1000 as part of a challenging incentive plan with a 10% ex ante probability of payout
(because $1000*10% = $100) to provide the same level of motivation as a guaranteed retention bonus
of $100.
107. For example, if a bonus plan was tied to confirming a plan of reorganization by a certain
date, we examined whether the bonus plan was approved by that date or if there was a subsequent
extension.
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the rate of payout appears to be similar across both time periods.
108 This
finding at least casts doubt on the view that the post-reform bonus plans are
different as a matter of substance, in addition to being procedurally
different from the pre-reform plans.
109
Second, I examine the schedule of payments under the bonus plan to
look for evidence that the payouts were increased to compensate
management for the increased risk of an incentive plan. After adjusting the
proposed maximum payouts for inflation, I find that CEOs received nearly
identical bonuses after the reform as they did under the pre-bankruptcy
retention bonus plans. Post-2005, firms implementing court-approved
bonus plans planned to pay a 30% year-over-year increase in CEO
compensation for the first year of bankruptcy, as compared to 29.3% for
the firms implementing bonus plans in the sample years before the reform.
A caveat to this analysis is that firms may have wanted to implement bonus
plans but felt restricted by the bankruptcy judge, so the observed maximum
bonus plans might be censored. However, this finding casts doubt on the
argument that these "incentive" bonuses are much riskier than the pre-
bankruptcy retention plans.
3. Assessing the Role of Creditors and the U.S. Trustee
Bankruptcy law, of course, understands that the bankruptcy judge
cannot ever know as much about a debtor as its management team and
relies on creditors and the Department of Justice's U.S. Trustee Program to
police abuses. As hypothesis three predicts, there are two theoretical
problems that might constrain the willingness and ability of the creditors
and U.S. Trustee to monitor executive compensation. The first is that the
creditors lack strong incentives to invest time and money into monitoring
relatively small bonus plans, as bonus plans represent only a small
percentage of the overall value on the table in a bankruptcy plan. The
second is that the U.S. Trustee suffers from a similar expertise deficit as the
judge, making it just as hard for the U.S. Trustee to distinguish challenging
108. The exception is a higher observed rate of payout for firms with whole firm sale targets and
payouts for emerging from bankruptcy. This likely reflects changes in bankruptcy practice, as it became
more common for firms to go into Chapter 11 and conduct going-concern sales. See, e.g., Douglas G.
Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, The End of Bankruptcy, 55 STAN. L. REV. 751, 751, 786-88 (2002)
(discussing the rise in the use of Chapter 11 as a platform for the sale of a firm's assets, often as a whole
firm going-concem sale).
109. This finding deserves two qualifications. As Table 4 shows, there is enough missing data to
potentially bias the result. Additionally, bonus plans often have "tiers" of goals (as where, for example,
a 10% revenue increase might yield $100 and a 15% revenue increase might yield $200), and I do not
systematically examine enough information to determine which payout tier was reached in enough
cases to report results.
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incentive plans from disguised retention plans. I analyze evidence of the
role played by creditors and the U.S. Trustee Program in turn.
a. The Observed Role of Creditors
In theory, creditors have limited incentives to police executive
compensation. While it is true that creditors are generally the residual
claimants of the firm, and thus the party that loses if management extracts
unearned compensation,11 0 their economic incentives are to focus more on
the hundreds of millions or billions of dollars that are at stake in large
bankruptcy cases, not the relatively small amount of money involved in
bonus plans.
110. For example, if management would have worked for $100, but extracts extra rents of $50 for
total compensation of $150, the extra $50 is money that could have otherwise been paid (in some form
or another) to unsecured creditors in the event they are not being paid in full.
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW RE VIEW
TABLE 5. Summary of Creditor and US Trustee Arguments Objecting to
Proposed Bonus Plans
Any Official Secured Unsecured U.S.
Argument Made in Objection Objector Committee Creditor Creditor Trustee
Disguised Retention Plan
Post-Reform Change
Incentives Not Clearly Defined?
Post-Reform Change
Incentives Not Hard Enough to
Achieve?
Post-Reform Change
No Need for Bonuses in this
Case
Post-Reform Change
Bonuses Are Too High
(Generically)
Post-Reform Change
Bonuses Are Too High (for
Industry)
Post-Reform Change
Bonuses Are Too High (Based




59.65% 33.33% 8.77% 3.51% 43.86%
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
47.37% 19.3% 8.77% 5.26% 36.84%
69.74% 38.3% 277.19% 126.32% 692.11%
42.11% 17.54% 5.26% 5.26% 26.32%
126.32% 88.6% N/A 126.32% 1031.58%
59.65% 26.32% 12.28% 5.26% 42.11%
97.3% 61.65% 428.07% 126.32% 352.63%
40.35% 14.04% 10.53% 7.02% 19.3%
33.47% -13.78% 13.16% 201.75% 314.91%
26.32% 8.77% 5.26% 1.75% 8.77%
182.89% 25.73% N/A N/A N/A
19.3%
-7.8%
7.02% 1.75% 1.75% 8.77%
-49.71% -24.56% N/A 277.19%
66.67% 33.33% 12.28% 7.02% 47.37%
68.63% 79.17% 32.02% 201.75% 307.37%
Note: This table summarizes observed arguments in written objections filed to proposed
bonus plans in the post-2005 reform sample period (2009 and 2010) and shows how that
litigation compares to the litigation observed for the pre-2005 sample. For example, post-
reform, the official committee of unsecured creditors filed an objection arguing that the
incentives were not hard enough to achieve in 17.54% of the cases in which a bankruptcy
bonus plan was proposed by management, which is an 88.6% increase from the pre-
reform baseline. Across the sample of cases, one of the parties in this table-either the
official committee, a secured or unsecured creditor, or the U.S. Trustee-filed an




To see how creditors actually used their bargaining power, I reviewed
all of the objections the official committee of unsecured creditors filed in
response to the firm's motion seeking bonus plan approval; those
objections are summarized in Table 5.111 There are limits to reviewing the
objections of the official committee, as doing so does not reveal how
creditors may have negotiated in the shadow of their right to object, nor
does it capture how creditors might have influenced bonus plans before
they were even proposed by the court. Accordingly, caution is needed in
interpreting this Section, as it relies on an incomplete record of creditor
influence on negotiations. In the Appendix, I present a summary Table,
which shows how bonus plans changed between being proposed on the
docket and being approved by the court. The Appendix Table suggests, at
least on paper, that Chapter 11 debtors are forced to make performance
goals more challenging in response to creditor demands.112
As Table 5 shows, official committees became much more litigious
after the 2005 reform. They filed written objections to 33% of the proposed
bonus plans, a 79% increase from the pre-reform sample. Categorizing the
objections, the most common legal argument-expressed in every case in
which the official committee objected-was that the bonus plan was a
disguised retention plan, violating the 2005 reform. This observed litigation
is obviously only a small part of their influence, as they almost certainly
negotiated in the shadow of their right to object and may have influenced
many bonus plans in unobserved ways.
However, creditor objections seldom presented particularized
criticisms of the proposed bonus plan. Creditors did file objections to the
proposed bonus plans alleging that the compensation level exceeded
industry standards in 26% of cases (as compared to 9% before the reform),
but that was only 40% of the cases for which an objection was filed. More
importantly, creditors only offered evidence from an opposing expert in 8%
of cases (as compared to 11% prior to the reform). For the five cases where
the official committee complained about the bonus plan exceeding industry
standards, one offered evidence from other Chapter 11 cases,1 13 one simply
111. In some cases, creditors file their own objections, either because they are secured creditors
who are not represented by any official committee or because they want to act on their own, apart from
the committee, for strategic reasons. I also summarize the litigation of these creditors as part of Table 4.
The qualitative trends I discuss in this Section, while focusing on the official committee, are the same as
the trends observed by unsecured creditors acting on their own.
112. It is difficult to evaluate this because managers may simply propose an unreasonable bonus
plan before moving the plan to what they know creditors will accept after negotiations and litigation. It
is hard to know if management actually "moved" or simply went to where they always planned to be.
113. Objection of the Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors to the Motion of the Debtors and
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pointed to the dire climate of the industry,"
4 two complained that the
numbers were high without supporting evidence of "competitive
compensation in the [company's] industry,"'
15  and one asked for
management to provide more information. 116 In no objection in the case
study sample was the judge provided with concrete numbers that could be
used to compare the bonus plan to an industry standard.
The Foamex Int'l, Inc. bankruptcy litigation provides a representative
example of a typical official committee objection to a proposed bonus plan.
Foamex's management originally sought approval of a bonus plan that
would pay out in the event that the company successfully sold its assets.
117
The committee first complained that the bonus plan motion was filed
"within the first few weeks of the case" and while the debtors were
attempting to sell the firm on a faster schedule than the committee
wanted." 8 The committee then complained that management was likely not
only to get the bankruptcy bonuses but also "generous employment
agreements" if the planned sale went through.
19 The committee further
deemed the bonus plan targets "effortless" and instead demanded that the
company link incentive compensation to "the payment of a dividend to
general unsecured creditors."l20 Nowhere in the objection is there any
analysis of the underlying compensation plan itself. There are only bald
complaints about how the committee disagreed with the idea of rewarding
management for a sale and preferred management receive a bonus in the
Debtors in Possession for Entry of an Order Approving a Key Employ. Incentive Plan at 8, In re
Midway Games, Inc., No. 09-10465 (Bankr. D. Del. Mar. 27, 2009), ECF No. 203.
114. Objection of the Official Comm. Of Unsecured Creditors to Debtor's Motion for Order
Approving the Implementation of Key Emp. Incentive Plan and Short Term Incentive Plan at 2, In 
re
Hayes Lemmerz Int'l, Inc., No. 09-11655 (Bankr. D. Del. Aug. 14, 2009), ECF No. 460 [hereinafter
Hayes Lemmerz Objection].
115. Objection of the Official Comm. Of Unsecured Creditors to Debtor's Motion for Order
Authorizing Use of Cash Collateral for Payments Regarding HVM LLC Incentive Program at 28, In re
Extended Stay Inc., No. 09-13764 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Oct. 26, 2009), ECF No. 530; Objection ofOfficial
Comm. Of Unsecured Creditors to Motion of the Debtors for an Order Authorizing the Debtors to
Continue Their Short-Term Incentive Plan at 12-13, In re Merisant Worldwide, Inc., No. 09-10059
(Bankr. D. Del. Mar. 20, 2009), ECF No. 211.
116. Objection of the Official Comm. Of Unsecured Creditors to: (A) Debtors' Motion for an
Order Authorizing the Debtors to Implement Severance and Non-Insider Retention Programs; and (B)
Debtors' Motion for an Order Authorizing the Implementation of the Visteon Incentive Program at
8-10, In re Visteon Corp., No. 09-11786 (Bankr. D. Del. Jul. 13, 2009), ECF No. 528.
117. Objection of the Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors to Debtors' Motion for Order
Authorizing Debtors to Adopt and Implement an Incentive Plan for Certain Key Employ. Pursuant to
Sections 363(b)(1), 503(c)(3), and 105(a) of the Bankr. Code at 13, In re Foamex Int'l, Inc., 368 B.R.
383 (Bankr. D. Del. 2007) (No. 09-10560).
118. Id. at l-2.
119. Id. at 2.
120. Id. at 2-4.
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event a plan of reorganization was approved, preferably one paying
unsecured creditors a significant recovery.121
Other official committee objections in the sample served as a similar
opportunity for the official committee to negotiate the plan of
reorganization through litigation. The lack of substance in some of these
objections suggests that the objection itself is better understood as a chance
to express a partisan view about how the Chapter 11 case should proceed.
For example, in the bankruptcy case of Trico Marine Servs., Inc., the
official committee informed the court that it objected because the
committee was at loggerheads with management over how the case would
proceed.2 2 In the bankruptcy of NEFF Corp., the official committee
complained that the Management Incentive Plan incentivized management
to approve a plan favored by senior lenders and not "explore alternative
plan strategies." 23 Similarly, in the Hayes Lemmerz bankruptcy, the
creditor's committee complained that bonuses should not be paid "for
merely confirming a plan quickly for the benefit of the Debtors' secured
lenders who ... were involved in the design and approval of the [bonus
plan.]"' 24
b. The Observed Role of the Department of Justice's U.S. Trustee
Program
Unlike creditors, the Department of Justice's U.S. Trustee Program
only has incentives to enforce bankruptcy policy. The trouble with the U.S.
Trustee's frequent interventions, as described further below, is that the
body largely lacks the expertise needed to effectively police executive
compensation.
Sure enough, as Table 5 shows, the U.S. Trustee became far more
litigious after the reform, objecting to almost half of filed bonus plans, a
300% increase from the pre-reform sample.125 The U.S. Trustee objection
121. See id. at 2-5.
122. Official Comm. Of Unsecured Creditors' Objection to Debtors' Motions to Shorten Notice
Relating to Their (1) Motion for Approval of Exec. Comp. and Emp. Incentive Plan for Non-Debtor
OpCo Subsidiaries and (II) Motion to File Related Exhibits Under Seal at 2-3, In re Trico Marine
Servs., Inc., 450 B.R. 474 (Bankr. D. Del. 2011) (No. 10-12653).
123. Debtors' Reply to the Objection of the Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors to Motion of
the Debtors for Entry of an Order Approving the Debtors' Key Employee Incentive Plan at 2, In re
NEFF Co., No. 10-12610 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jun. 28, 2010), ECF No. 199. In response, the debtors
moved the "emergence incentive award" to the plan of reorganization. Id. at 3; see also supra note 90
and accompanying text.
124. Hayes Lemmerz Objection, supra note 114, at 3.
125. In one case, the Debtor complained that the U.S. Trustee's objection "appears to be based on
a form and ignores the evidence [the debtor] submitted." Tronox's Response to the Objection of the
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in the Lear Corporation bankruptcy is fairly representative of U.S. Trustee
objections in the sample.12 6 The Trustee first asserted that the proposed
incentive plan is actually a disguised retention plan on the grounds that the
milestones are too easy to achieve.
127 To support this claim, the U.S.
Trustee pointed out that the major bankruptcy-related milestones have to do
with filing a plan of reorganization, which, the U.S. Trustee noted, has
already been mostly negotiated by the time the firm filed for bankruptcy.1
2 8
Accordingly, this is not the type of "challenging result " that "warrant[s] a
bonus." 29 The U.S. Trustee also noted that the responsibility of preparing a
plan of reorganization mostly falls on the debtors' lawyers-not the
managers-meaning managers do not deserve a bonus for work done by
their lawyers.130 The Trustee then noted that the financial targets for part of
the bonus payment were not disclosed, and therefore, may be too easy.
Therefore, the Trustee demanded that management produce more evidence
to satisfy its burden of proof.131
This sort of conclusory analysis characterizes many other U.S. Trustee
objections in the sample. In one case, the U.S. Trustee condemned a bonus
plan linked to asset sales by declaring that the plan simply "require[s] the
employees to do their jobs" and was not "tied to any specified sales activity
or task." 32 In another case, the U.S. Trustee objected that a bonus plan
linked to an asset sale paid managers "based on the first dollar of proceeds"
and was thus insufficiently incentivizing.
133 In another example, the U.S.
Trustee pointed out that a different sale incentive plan would create
rewards "determined in large part by complicated macroeconomic, market
and industry-specific forces" and that management's contribution to the
effort would be minimal, calling the incentivizing nature of the plan into
U.S. Tr. to Tronox's Motion for Entry of an Order Approving Tronox's Key Emp. Incentive Plan at 2,
In re Tronox, Inc., 503 B.R. 239 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) (No. 09-10156).
126. See generally Objection of the U.S. Tr. to Debtor's Motion for Order Approving Debtors'
Key Mgmt. Incentive Plan, In re Lear Corp., No. 09-14326 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jul. 20, 2009), ECF No.
161.
127. Id. at 1-2, 6.




132. U.S. Tr.'s Objection to Debtors' Motion for Entry of an Order Authorizing Incentive
Payments to Debtors Employees at 3, In re Noble Int'l Ltd., No. 09-51720 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Apr. 22,
2009), ECF No. 60.
133. U.S. Tr.'s Objection to the Debtors Motion for Entry of an Order Approving the Debtor's
Incentive Plan and Authorizing Payments Thereunder Pursuant to §§ 363(b) and 503(b) at 2, In re
Vermillion, Inc., No. 09 -11091 (Bankr. D. Del. May 6, 2009), ECF No. 42.
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question.134
Another noteworthy change in the U.S. Trustee's litigation activity
after the 2005 reform is that the written objections became visibly more
alike, with similar allegations and complaints about the bonus plans. I can
quantify this using a cosine-similarity analysis. At a high level, a cosine-
similarity analysis measures the textual similarity between two
documents-it can be used to detect whether, for example, documents are
based on a single template.13 5 To quantify the similarity between the
written objections before and after the 2005 reform, I calculated the cosine
similarity score of every filed objection with every other written objection
and took a mean for each case. I then took the mean for the U.S. Trustee for
all objections filed in each period of the case study sample. Prior to the
2005 amendment, the mean cosine similarity score for each objection in the
dataset filed by the U.S. Trustee was 0.68. After the change, the mean
cosine similarity score was 0.87, a roughly 28% increase. If nothing else,
this analysis suggests that the written objections became much more
generic and much less individualized after the change, which also required
the various U.S. Trustee's offices to file many more objections than they
had in the past.
One possibility is that the U.S. Trustee's vigorous, yet-generic,
litigation after the reform reflects a policy of objecting to bonus plans
under political pressure from Congress, and there is some public evidence
of that pressure. On February 7, 2012, Senator Charles Grassley, the
ranking member of the United States Senate Judiciary Committee, wrote
the U.S. Trustee to ask for information on how that office's role in policing
bankruptcy bonus plans was going after the 2005 reforms.136 The Trustee
responded that
[t]he United States Trustee Program (USTP) of the Justice
Department vigorously seeks to enforce the [2005 amendments
restricting bankruptcy bonus plans.] ... Although all parties in
interest in a chapter 11 case have standing to object to [bankruptcy
bonus plans], the USTP often is the only party in a case to do
so.... [A]necdotal evidence suggests that the USTP's section
503(c) litigation success rate before the bankruptcy courts is lower
134. BearingPoint Objection, supra note 41, at 7.
135. See Kan Nishida, Demystifying Text Analytics Part 3-Finding Similar Documents with
Cosine Similarity Algorithim, MEDIUM: LEARN DATA SCIENCE (June 23, 2016), https://blog.exploratory
.io/demystifying-text-analytics-finding-similar-documents-with-cosine-similarity-e7b9e5b8e515.
136. See Letter from Assistant Attorney Gen. Ronald Weich, to U.S. Senator Charles E. Grassley
I (Mar. 5, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/Letter031312.pdf.
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than its success rate for any other litigation on which the USTP
maintains data.137
IV. THE CASE FOR RETHINKING THE 2005 REFORM
This Article's account of the 2005 reform suggests that various
institutional limitations and incentive problems have undermined the ability
of the bankruptcy system to achieve the policy goals that prompted the
reform. The main challenge in designing a further legal change that solves
the issues previously identified is that many of the problems are structural.
Bankruptcy judges are not suddenly going to become experts in executive
compensation, and the incentives of creditors will continue to lead them to
focus on larger bankruptcy issues, rather than the relatively small amounts
of money at stake in discussing executive compensation. The Department
of Justice's U.S. Trustee Program will continue to litigate aggressively, but
the underlying problems of informational asymmetry and an expertise
deficit will limit their ability to help the bankruptcy judge's deliberation.
Moreover, this Article suggests that the reform may very well have
had significant negative consequences for bankruptcy practice. By driving
at least some executive compensation underground, the reform may have
decreased, on average, the public's view into the black box of executive
compensation of Chapter 11 debtors. The reform may have increased
bankruptcy costs and redistributed value from creditors to lawyers. The
reform has put very real pressure on the bankruptcy judge and Department
of Justice to conduct inquiries that they are poorly situated to perform, a
difficult situation exacerbated by the continuing public interest in executive
compensation of Chapter 11 debtors.
Of course, in a cost-benefit analysis, these flaws must be analyzed in
light of the potential benefits of the 2005 reform, and the analysis above
identified two potential benefits. First, it is possible that some firms that
might have implemented opportunistic and unnecessary bonus plans are
choosing not to do so in light of the more challenging legal path to
obtaining approval of such plans. Second, it is possible that the reform may
have improved public confidence in our bankruptcy system. After all, court
consideration of executive bonus plans continues to invite public and press
scrutiny.138 To the extent the reform pushed boards of directors to engage
in regulatory evasion to avoid the public spectacle of a hearing on
137. Id.at2.
138. See Jonathan Randles, Westmoreland Paid Millions in Executive Bonuses in Year Before




executive compensation, the reform may have helped the bankruptcy courts
avoid adverse headlines. While it is possible that the reform provided some
benefit by forcing the development of compensation contracts that lead
managers to perform better, the evidence supporting this view is difficult to
assess and nothing in this study suggests that this is the case on average.
However, this Article cannot dismiss the possibility that the structure of
executive compensation was indeed improved by the 2005 reform.
In light of the evidence presented in this Article, Congress and
bankruptcy judges should re-think the 2005 reform. Two changes seem
particularly worthwhile. First, Congress should consider providing the
Department of Justice ("DOJ") with funding to hire their own executive
compensation experts who can assist with policing executive
compensation. Bonuses for senior managers are an important part of
modem corporate governance, and reflexive objections without detailed
analysis to all proposed bonus plans are unlikely to improve the
administration of bankruptcy law. The current situation would be improved
if the DOJ had access to greater expertise, whether through new employees
or money to hire consultants.
Second, Congress (or bankruptcy judges) should consider creating
new post-bankruptcy reporting requirements to force post-bankruptcy
Chapter 11 debtors to report their overall level of senior management
compensation for a period of two years after bankruptcy. This will not
solve all of the problems described above, but it would curtail the ability of
managers to extract promises from creditors in bankruptcy that lead to
excess compensation once the firm leaves bankruptcy court. Very few
Chapter 11 debtors emerge from bankruptcy as public companies these
days, which creates a regulatory blind spot that might be aided through
additional disclosure that discourages the worst abuses, such as the
example of Citadel Broadcasting.
CONCLUSION
This Article's account of the 2005 reform is one of the most detailed
analyses of an executive compensation regulation in the scholarly literature
to date. As the results above show, the reform clearly appears to have
reduced the usage of bankruptcy bonus plans and forced firms to style their
bonus plans as "incentive plans." However, the incentive plans that are
approved create similarly sized bonuses to the retention plans approved
before the reform, which suggests that the risk associated with the
probability of bonus payment might not have been materially increased.
This may be why incentive bonus plans after the reform appear to result in
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pay-outs just as often as the pre-reform retention plans did. I also do not
find evidence that the reform altered the overall level of compensation of
the CEOs of Chapter 11 debtors. At the same time, the evidence suggests
that the reform may have made the process of formulating a bonus plan
more expensive than it had been prior to the enactment of a more
demanding legal standard.
While the new statutory scheme does appear to have succeeded in
giving new bargaining power to creditors, they do not, at the least, appear
to use this bargaining power to inform the judge of substantive problems
with the underlying bonus plan. They appear, instead, to use their right to
object mostly to pursue their partisan bankruptcy interests of influencing
the overall plan of reorganization. This conclusion is qualified because I do
not observe the work they might do outside of court negotiating the terms
of the bonus plan-work which is clearly ongoing. But it is hard to say
based on the evidence that creditors are using their new governance power
to make executives more accountable, implement true pay-for-
performance, or reduce the overall level of compensation, as Congress
intended. Indeed, more than ten years after its implementation, the putative
benefits of the reform are hard to identify.
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APPENDIX: METHODOLOGY FOR ANALYZING BANKRUPTCY
COSTS
A team of research assistants, acting under my supervision, reviewed
all of the legal bills filed by the debtor's attorneys for every Chapter 11
bankruptcy in the case study sample. For each case, the research assistants
began with the first fee request and reviewed all of the bills until the time
period including the day that the first bankruptcy bonus plan (in the pre-
reform period, usually key employee retention plans, and in the post-reform
era, key employee incentive plans ("KElP")) was approved by the court.
The review team stopped reviewing time entries after the day the KEIP was
approved.
A representative example from the post-reform 2009 bankruptcy case
of Foamex International, filed by the debtor's counsel Akin Gump,
includes the following entries:
1. 03/26/09 SLN 0018 Review asset purchase agreement for Tax
issues. 0.6
2. 03/01/09 AQ 0019 Emails re KElP. 0.2
3. 03/01/09 PMA 0019 Review and respond to email re KEIP motion
(.1). 0.1
4. 03/02/09 ISD 0019 O/C AQ re: KEIP. 0.7
5. 03/03/09 RJR 0019 Telephone conference w/l. Rosenblatt re Asset
Purchase Agreement and relevant labor issues. 0.3139
Time entries #1 and #5 have nothing to do with the key employee
incentive plan (or at least were not written down by the attorney to reflect
that they do), so those time entries were discarded by the research assistant.
Time entries #3, #4, and #5 reflect work on the incentive plan. The research
assistant recorded all of the time each attorney spent on the KEIP,
multiplied those numbers by the court approved attorney's billing rate, and
tabulated the amount the debtor's attorneys charged for work on the
bankruptcy bonus plan. The research assistant also obtained the debtor's
final fee applications to record the total amount billed for the bankruptcy
case to understand what percentage of the overall bankruptcy costs (at least
the portion owed to the debtor's main attorney) was devoted to bankruptcy
139. See Second Monthly Application of Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP, Co-Counsel for
Debtors and Debtors in Possession, for Interim Allowance of Compensation and for the Reimbursement
of Expenses for Services Rendered During the Period from March 1, 2009 through March 31, 2009, Ex.
B at 14, In re Foamex International Inc., No. 09-10560 (Bankr. D. Del. May 11, 2009), ECF No. 390.
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bonus plan matters, before and after the reform.
The total review constituted more than 103,781 pages of attorney time
entries and cover notes from 792 fee applications.
APPENDIX TABLE
Bonus Plan
1. Attorney's Fees for Implementing a Bankruptcy
(5) (6)
Log Debtor Log Debtor
Counsel Counsel
(1) (2) (3) (4) Bonus Plan Bonus Plan
Log Debtor Log Debtor Log Debtor Log Debtor Fees as a Fees as a
Counsel Counsel Counsel Counsel Percentage Percentage
Bonus Plan Bonus Plan Bonus Plan Bonus Plan of Total of Total
Fees Fees Hours Hours Case Fees Case Fees
Post-
2005 0.962*** 0.781*** 0.714*** 0.636** 0.597** 0.747**
Reform
Filing (0.292) (0.288) (0.267) (0.297) (0.238) (0.337)
R2  0.13 0.50 0.09 0.42 0.07 0.30
N 75 69 80 74 80 74
Firm
Financial
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry
FE No No No Yes No Yes
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Appendix Table 1 displays ordinary least squared regression with
robust standard errors in parenthesis. Industry Fixed Effects are Fama-
French 12. "Debtor Counsel Bonus Plan Fees" are the logged total fees in
constant 2010 dollars associated with negotiating, writing, and obtaining
the approval of a bonus plan. "Debtor Counsel Bonus Plan Hours" are the
logged total hours in constant 2010 dollars associated with negotiating,
writing, and obtaining the approval of a bonus plan. "Debtor Counsel
Bonus Plan Fees as a Percentage of Total Case Fees" are the percentage of
the debtor's overall bill that are associated with the bonus plan.
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APPENDIX TABLE 2. Changes in Proposed Bonus Plans from Version
First Filed with Court to Version Approved by Court
Pre-Reform Sample Post-Reform Sample
(n=43) (n=57)
Bonus Plan Approved? 97.67% 91.23%
Financial Targets Raised? 2.33% 22.81%
Bankruptcy Milestone Targets 2.33% 10.53%
Lengthened?
Bonus Capped? 13.95% 17.54%
Appendix Table 2 summarizes the observed changes in bonus plans
from the version first filed with the court to the version approved by the
judge. For example, financial targets are raised in 22% of the post-2005
reform bonus plans between the original filing on the court docket and the
judge's approval order. Bankruptcy milestones are event dates in the
bankruptcy process, such as the day a plan of reorganization is approved. In
10.5% of cases, the deadlines tied to those goals were lengthened, such as
giving management 180 days to obtain approval of an order selling
substantially all of the firm's assets instead of 120 days.
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